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INTRODUCTION
The Acid Rain Trading Program under the Clean Air Acf has
shown initial success. Many believe that its initial success supports
more flexible, market-based environmental regulations3 to achieve the
nation's environmental goals more cheaply.4 The United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has proposed to move away
from its traditional command-and-control New Source Review
program (NSR Program), which requires many air pollution sources
to install new and often expensive pollution control technology, to a
more flexible and cost-effective one.' Specifically, EPA proposes to
I U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Acid Rain Program, at
http://www.epa.gov/acidrain/overview.html (last updated Dec. 11, 2000). "The
overall goal ofthe Acid Rain Program is to achieve significant environmental and
public health benefits through reductions in emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2) and
nitrogen oxides (NO.), the primary causes of acid rain. To achieve this goal at the
lowest cost to society, the program employs both traditional and innovative,
market-based approaches for controlling air pollution." Id.
2 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q)(1995).
Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, The Political Economy of
Market-Based Environmental Policy: The US. Acid Rain Program, 41 J.L. &
ECON. 37, 81 (1998) [hereinafter Joskow & Schmalensee, Acid Rain Program].
"Demonstrating this theory [innovative tradable emissions permit system] in the
large-scale acid rain program may lead to fundamental changes in environmental
policies and significant reductions in their costs." Id. The EPA already claims that
"[t]he Acid Rain Program is already being viewed around the world as a prototype
for tackling emerging environmental issues." U. S. Environmental Protection
Agency, The AcidRain Program, at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/arp/overview
.html (last updated Dec. 11, 2000).
4 GARY C. BRYNER, BLUE SKIES, GREEN POLITICS: THE CLEAN AIR ACT OF
1990 3 (1995). "Environmental policy makers must consider both environmental
and economic goals and concerns. The question they attempt to answer has often
posed in stark terms ofwhether priority should be given to the protection ofhuman
health and ecological systems, or to economic growth and competitiveness." Id.
5 Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New
Source Review (NSR), 61 Fed. Reg. 38,250, 38,251 (proposed July 23, 1996) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 51 & 52).
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set an actual emissions cap' for each source to assure maximum
flexibility and cost-effectiveness' in the NSR Program (Proposed
6 61 Fed. Reg. at 38,264. "The EPA today proposes a new applicability
approach for existing sources under which a source . . . may base its NSR
applicability on a plantwide emissions cap, termed a plantwide applicability
limitation (PAL)." Id. Unfortunately, the EPA states elsewhere that "[t]he EPA
proposes to define [PAL] as a federally enforceable plantwide emissions limitation
established . . . to limit the allowable emissions . . ." Id. (emphasis added). I
assume that EPA meant actual emissions. If it did not, then the arguments in this
paper against a static PAL cap apply with more force. See infra note 257.
7 I make the textbook assumption that the marginal cost of reducing
pollution generally increases for a firm and for society generally. See ROBERT
COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 22-23 (2000). Assuming that the
marginal cost of reducing pollution is generally neutral or decreases is contrary to
the history of pollution. Moreover, if true for a firm, then a profit maximizing firm
will reduce pollution to zero in order to maximize profits. Thus, environmental
regulations would be superfluous. Id. Nonetheless, some studies show that
environmental protection may increase employment opportunities and productivity
for firms and society. "The main assumption of most macroeconomic researchers
has been that environmental regulations would force firms to invest in pollution
abatement activities instead of productive activities, which would have an adverse
effect on productivity. Furthermore, it was feared that the regulations would force
the diversion of research and development expenditures from production to
pollution abatement activities. This view has, however, been challenged by Meyers
and Nakamura, who claimed that environmental regulations may actually facilitate
economic growth. They used a clay model to demonstrate that environmental
regulations would force firms to modernize their plants to meet the stringent
environmental standards. As a result, the plants would be more efficient and
productive." MARTIN FREEDMAN AND BIKKI JAGGI, AIR AND WATER POLLUTION:
REGULATION: ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES, 195
(1993)(citations omitted) [hereinafter FREEDMAN & JAGGI, AIR AND WATER
POLLUTION]. "Environmental policy will create new jobs in abatement activities
and in the eco-industry where new abatement capital is produced. Many studies
suggest that environmental policy will have positive employment effects not only
in abatement and in the eco-industry but for the economy as a whole." HORST
SIEBERT, ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT: THEORY AND POLICY 69 (5th ed. rev.
1998)(citations omitted). As Professor Siebert explains, however, the proper
comparison is not between the productivity of a firm before modernization and the
firm after modernization because of new pollution control technology, but rather
it is between the modernized firm with and without pollution control technology.
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NSR Program). The economic costs and environmental limits of the
Acid Rain Trading Program and the history of grandfathered, coal-
fired power plants demonstrates that any reform of the NSR Program
must encourage grandfathered and other older sources to install new
pollution control technology. Setting an actual emissions cap for
each source will not work, therefore, to encourage cost-effective
modifications of existing sources unless combined with required
reductions in actual emissions as in the Acid Rain Program. Absent
these required reductions, EPA should institute more modest reforms
that simplify the NSR Program and increase flexibility without using
an actual emissions cap.
I. THE CLEAN AIR ACT REFLECTS AN UNCERTAIN AND
CHANGING BALANCE AMONG ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND ENERGY NEEDS
Congress enacted the Clean Air Act to protect the public
health by protecting and enhancing ambient air quality.' Protecting
and enhancing air quality is a complex and difficult task by itself, but
Congress also sought to allow economic growth and meet energy
needs. Attempting to balance these different and sometimes
conflicting goals has led to a complicated regulatory system with an
uncertain and changing balance among the environmental protection,
"At a given production technology, there is a tradeoff between environmental
quality and the availability of other goods. Resource costs are opportunity costs
since resources used for abatement are lost for production purposes." Id. at 66.
This is true for society as a whole. Id. at 69-70 (even a public policy choice that
improves environmental quality without reducing economic activity implies lost
opportunity costs). The public policy question remains whether society wants more
environmental quality or more economic activity.
Ann Brewster Weeks, AdvisingNature: Can We Get Clean Air From the
OldDirties? 33 NEW ENG. L. REv. 707, 708, n.6 (1999). "Grandfathering is the
exemption ofolder coal-and oil-firedpower plants from stringent pollution controls
required of newly constructed sources."
9 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1)(1995).
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economic growth, and energy needs.'o
A. Protecting and Enhancing Air Ouality under the
Clean Air Act
The Clean Air Act covers all sorts of air emissions." It covers
steel mills, power plants, and copper smelters.12 Reducing emissions
of one pollutant may increase those of another." Some industries are
cyclical in nature with high production and emissions one year and
much lower production and emissions the next year.'4 It applies to
power plants built over fifty years ago and ones that will be built
tomorrow. In order to address this diversity, the Clean Air Act seeks
to protect air quality through a system of health-based standards and
technology-based standards.
EPA sets National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)
for six criteria pollutants that "allowing an adequate margin of safety,
are requisite to protect the public health."" Areas of the country that
do not meet NAAQS for a specific criteria pollutant are in
"nonattainment" for that criteria pollutant. 6 Conversely, areas of the
country that meet the NAAQS for a criteria pollutant are in
"attainment."
10 As long ago as 1984, the United States Supreme Court, quoting the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, noted that Congress provides
vague standards for the EPA to follow in the Clean Air Act. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 841 n.5 (1984). This has led to
an at least temporary revitalization of nondelegation doctrine whereby Congress
cannot delegate its legislative powers to an administrative agency. Am. Trucking
Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
1" See 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1) (criteria pollutants) (1995). See also 42
U.S.C. § 7412(b)(initial list of hazardous air pollutants) (1995).
12 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (1995).
13 SIEBERT, supra note 7, at 165.
14 Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New
Source Review (NSR), 61 Fed. Reg. 38,250, 38,258 (proposed July 23, 1996) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 51, 52).
15 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1995).
16 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501(2), 7407(d) (1995).
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Different requirements apply depending on an area's
attainment status. In nonattainment areas, major stationary sources17
must, among other things, obtain a permit prior to starting
operations," comply with the lowest achievable emission rate
(LAER)," and obtain "offsets" of existing emissions for its new
emissions.2 0 These requirements also apply to sources that make
"modifications" to their facilities or operations.21
State Implementation Plans (SIPS) adopted by the States must
assure compliance with the NAAQS by certain dates.22 Failure to
comply with NAAQS by those dates may trigger sanctions23 and EPA
administered compliance measures.24
In attainment areas, the Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD) program protects the public health and air quality
from unrestricted and unregulated economic growth.25 The PSD
1 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (a)(3) (1995).
18 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a) (1995).
19 .42 U.S.C. § 7501 (a)(3) (1995). "The term [LAER] means for any source,
that rate of emissions which reflects the most stringent emission limitation which
is contained in the implementation plan of any State for such class or category of
source, unless the owner or operator ofthe proposed source demonstrates that such
limitations are not achievable, or the most stringent emission limitation which is
achieved in practice by such class or category of source, whichever is more
stringent." Id.
20 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(1)(A) (1995). Other requirements include: a demon-
stration that "all major stationary sources owned or operated [by the owner or
operator of the proposed new source] . . . are in compliance." 42 U.S.C. §
7503(a)(3) (1995). That "the Administrator has not determined that the [plan
applicable to the nonattainment area] is not being adequately implemented." 42
U.S.C. § 7503(a)(4) (1995). That "an analysis ofalternative sites, sizes, production
processes, and environmental control techniques for such proposed source
demonstrates that benefits of the proposed source significantly outweigh the
environmental and social costs imposed as a result of its location, construction, or
modification" 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(5) (1995).
21 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(5) (1995).
22 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(2) (1995).
23 42 U.S.C. § 7410(m) (1995).
24 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) (1995).
25 42 U.S.C. § 7470 (1995).
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program requires major air pollution emitting facilities26 generally to
obtain a permit prior to starting construction,27 install the best
available control technology (BACT),28 and comply with several
other requirements." PSD requirements also apply to sources that
make "modifications" to their facilities or operations."
LAER and BACT are technology-based standards that apply
to individual pollution sources. They must meet or exceed the
technology-based New Source Performance Standards (NSPS)."
NSPS apply to categories of sources ranging from fertilizer plants to
steel plants to municipal solid waste incinerators.32
Technology-based standards serve several purposes. First,
they assure a modicum of fairness to the regulated community. Every
major pollution source and every major modification of a source must
26 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (1995). The PSD Program refers to "major emitting
facilities." This article will refer to both "major emitting facilities" and "major
stationary sources" as "sources" unless the distinction is important. Id.
27 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a) (1995).
28 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (1995). "Best Available Control Technology"
(BACT) means an emission limitation, including a visible emission standard, based
on the maximum degree of reduction for each pollutant subject to regulation under
the Clean Air Act, which would be emitted from any proposed major stationary
source or major modification which the EPA Administrator, on a case-by-case
basis, taking into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other
costs, determines is achievable for such source or modification through application
of production processes or available methods, systems, and techniques, including
fuel cleaning or treatment or innovative fuel combustion techniques for control of
such pollutant. Id. BACT cannot be less than the New Source Performance
Standards required by 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4) (1995) and contained in 40 C.F.R.
§§60 & 61. Id.
29 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a) (1995). Other requirements include pre- and post-
construction monitoring, dispersion modeling to estimate air quality impacts and
an analysis of the source's effect on designated pristine areas. Id.
30 42 U.S.C. § 7479(2)(C) (1995).
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501(3), 7479(3) (1995).
32 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a) (1995).
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install some form of pollution control technology." Similar sources
in the same area must install technology meeting the same
standards.34
Second, these technology-based standards force technology,
which is one of the basic goals of the Clean Air Act.3 s LAER and
BACT place the burden on a source to show why it cannot use a
particular control technology. 6 In practice, this forces sources to
develop and adopt new technologies or to apply proven technologies
from one industry or process to a different industry or process.37
Once a single source adopts a technology, then it may become BACT
or LAER for an entire industry. This process improves air
quality-or at least reduces the deterioration of-air quality.
Together these requirements impart an important "new source
bias" into the Clean Air Act. While new sources must undergo NSR
and often install expensive pollution control technology, existing
sources can avoid undergoing NSR and installing expensive pollution
control technology by not modernizing or expanding. NSR causes
"There are significant advantages to technology forcing: all firms are
required to comply as a matter of fairness; enforcement can be monitored simply
be ensuring that the equipment is in place; pollution levels decrease, and incentives
are created for firms to develop and market control technologies in the United
States and throughout the world." BRYNER, supra note 4, at 142.
34 Id. Fairness, as always, is in the eye of the beholder. If one source emits
less because it uses cleaner fuel, then requiring it to install expensive, unneeded
pollution control technology would deprive it ofa competitive advantage compared
to sources that bum dirtier fuel and need to install pollution control technology to
protect the environment. Id.
3s Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901, 909 (7th Cir. 1990)
(citation omitted).
36 For a discussion on how well technology-based standards force tech-
nology, see infra Parts II.D.2, VI.B.
37 SIEBERT, supra note 7, at 133.
38 T. H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING
POLLUTION POLICY 119 (1985). "This new source bias causes the turnover of
capital equipment to occur more slowly than would otherwise be the case. Older,
more heavily polluting processes are retained longer while newer, less heavily
polluting processes wait on the sidelines. By extending the useful economic life
2000] 9
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existing sources to operate longer and to operate unchanged longer
than they would without the NSR Program." The delay in
modernizing imposes costs on both industry and society.
A complex system of health-based standards and
technological based standards protects air quality in the United States.
It imposes a "new source bias" that mean sources modernize less
frequently than they otherwise would.
B. Accommodating economic and energy concerns into the
Clean Air Act
Congress incorporated economic and energy concerns into the
Clean Air Act in many ways.40 This political process resulted in
many adhoc compromises that significantly retarded progress toward
better air quality without providing any consistence guidance on the
proper balance among environmental protection, economic growth,
and energy needs.4 1
EPA sets the NAAQS for criteria pollutants based on health
of the most heavily polluting plants, the current emissions trading program is
making the attainment of the ambient standards more costly and less rapid." Id.
See also ROBERT W. CRANDALL, CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION: THE
ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 39-44 (1983) (comparing the
differences between the new-source and existing-source standards for various
industries).
TIETENBERG, supra note 38, at 119.
40 BRYNER, supra note 4, at 6. "For more than two decades, environmental
policy has been defined as a balancing of environmental quality and economic
growth. Despite the broad language of some statutes that set absolute goals of
clean air and water and no loss of endangered species, [the reality ofregulation has
been that] the cost of compliance with environmental regulations has been [the key
concern]." Id. Cost considerations, rather than achievement of the public health or
environmental preservation goal, have largely determined to what extent
environmental goals are met. Some presidential administrations have adjusted the
balance more towards economic costs than others, butno administration has sought
to implement the laws in ways that would actually achieve the goals they contain.
41 Id
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and without regard to economics,4 2 but Congress has never required
immediate compliance with NAAQS in nonattainment areas.
Congress did not even impose a moratorium on new construction or
mandate reductions by existing facilities. Instead, it accommodated
environmental quality and economic by requiring only "reasonable
further progress" toward attainment by a future date. The Clean Air
Act allows for special rules to apply for areas targeted for economic
growth."
Furthermore Congress has often postponed compliance with
NAAQS to accommodate economic and energy concerns. Congress
repeatedly waived motor vehicle emission standards to help the
automobile manufacturers.45 In the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments,
Congress gave nonattainment areas additional time to meet the
NAAQS. 46 Again in 1990, Congress provided more time for
nonattainment areas to meet the NAAQS .47 EPA estimates that 90
million people currently live in nonattainment areas for one or more
criteria pollutants.48
The PSD program expressly allows sources to increase
emissions in attainment areas as long as the NAAQSs are not
violated.49 The PSD program protects the public health and air
quality in attainment areas from unrestricted and unregulated
economic growth. Economic growth must "occur in a manner
consistent with the preservation of existing clean air resources," 0 but
can occur.
42 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1) (1995).
43 42 U.S.C. § 7503(c)(2)(B) (1995).
44 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(1)(B) (1995).
4 BRYNER, supra note 4, at 81-85.
46 Id. at 103.
47 Id. at 107.
48 The Plain English Guide to the Clean AirAct, at http://www.epa.gov/oar/
oaqps/peg.caa. (last modified Jan. 2001).
49 42 U.S.C. § 7473(b)(1) (1995). The PSD program allows a source to use
only an "increment' of the difference between current air quality and the NAAQS
in order to save room for future economic growth.
5o 42 U.S.C. § 7470(3) (1995).
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LAER in non-attainment areas imposes the most stringent
emission limitation nationwide for a class of sources and thereby
precludes explicit consideration of the economic situation of an
individual source.s BACT in attainment areas requires individu-
alized consideration.5 2 The Administrator also has the discretion to
approve alternative control methods if BACT or the measurement
methodology necessary for BACT is economically infeasible." NSPS
may take into account "the remaining useful lives" of existing sources
in the category.5 4
Congress has incorporated compromises regarding pollution
control technology and economics into the Clean Air Act. Most
notably, Congress forced Western power plants burning low sulfur
coal to install technology that arguably only Midwestern power plants
burning high sulfur coal needed." Congress also grandfathered older
5 42 U.S.C. § 7501(a)(3) (1995).
52 BACT "means an emission limitation. .. , any proposed major stationary
source or major modification which the [EPA Administrator], on a case-by-case
basis, taking into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other
costs, determines is achievable for such facility through application of production
processes or available methods, systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning,
clean fuels, or treatment or innovative fuel combustion techniques for control of
such pollutant." 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (1995).
s3 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (1995). If the Administrator determines that
technology or economic limitations on the application of measurement
methodology to a particular emissions unit would make the imposition of an
emissions standard infeasible, a design, equipment, work practice, operational
standard, or combination thereof, may be prescribed instead to satisfy the
requirement for the application of best available control technology. Such standard
shall, to the degree possible, set forth the emissions reduction achievable by
implementation of such design, equipment, work practice or operation, and shall
provide compliance by means which achieve equivalent results. 42 U.S.C. §
7411(h)(1) (1995).
54 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(d)(1), 7411(d)(2) (1995).
ss "In akey compromise, new fossil-fuel-burning power plants were required
to utilize 'the best technological system of continuous emission reduction,'
understood to mean 'scrubbers.' Scrubbing of sulfur dioxide emissions was
required even if companies used low-sulfur coal, thus removing much of the
incentive to replace high-sulfur coal with low sulfur and protecting the high-sulfur
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sources that continue to operate in the same manner.5
The timing of NSR reflects a balance between environmental
protection and economic growth.s" I will discuss this extensively in
the next section.
The Clean Air Act reflects a balance among clean air,
economic growth and energy needs. What the precise balance is and
how to apply it in any specific case is, however, occasionally difficult
to discern.
11. THE CURRENT NEw SOURCE REVIEw PROGRAM IS
COMPLEX, OFTEN CONFUSING, AND POTENTIALLY UNFAIR
Faced with difficult policy choices between energy,
economics and environment," conflicts among the States and
regions," adverse and conflicting court decisions6 o and little
Congressional guidance,6' EPA has had a tough task balancing the
coal industry." BRYNER, supra note 4, at 103.
56 Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901, 909 (7th Cir. 1990).
s7 BRYNER, supra note 4, at 144. "New stationary sources of pollution, or
expansion of existing ones, are expected to be cleaner than older sources . .. since
retrofitting of older facilities is assumed to be more expensive than the installation
of control equipment as new facilities are built." Id.
58 Id. at 4.
59 See Michigan v. EPA, 31 ENV'T REP. 421 (D.C.Cir. 2000)(this is most
recent example of litigation involving EPA requiring Midwestern States to reduce
nitrogen oxide emissions). The conflict began, however, in 1970. Joskow &
Schmalensee, Acid Rain Program, supra note 3, at 45. See also BRYNER, supra
note 4, at 82, 96-97 (political fight between high-sulfur coal producing and using
states versus Northeastern States that suffer from pollution from high-sulfur coal).
States also had conflicts because they implemented 1970 and 1977 Clean Air Act
differently. FREEDMAN & JAGGI, AIR AND WATER POLLUTION REGULATION, supra
note 7, at 125.
60 See Wisconsin Elec. Power, 893 F.2d at 909. See generally Alabama
Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979); ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578
F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
61 BRYNER, supra note 4, at 42-43. "The EPA's budget and resources are
overwhelmed by the areas of responsibility Congress and the White House
continue to place under the agency'sjurisdiction, by changes in technology, and by
2000] 13
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environment with economic and energy concerns in its NSR Program.
For the last twenty years EPA has tried to increase flexibility in its
NSR Program.62 The difficulty in determining when sources,
especially existing sources, should undergo NSR has caused,
however, EPA to create a complex, often confusing, and potentially
unfair NSR Program that, like many compromises, only partially
achieves the goal of cost-effectiveness while weakening
environmental protection.
A. The timing of NSR
NSR is crucial to improving air quality and to the economic
well-being of sources. Requiring too few sources to undergo NSR
hinders the protection and enhancement of air quality. Requiring too
many sources to undergo NSR or the same source to undergo too
many NSRs imposes excessively high costs on sources,"
increases in industrial activity." Id. at 42. The EPA has a difficult job with
Congress passing new laws and amending old laws, little new money for
retrospection, and problems to resolve. Paul R. Portney, Foreword to POLLUTION
CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES: EVALUATING THE SYSTEM, ix-x (J. Clarence
Davies & Jan Mazurek eds., 1998).
62 "There were two reasons for attempting to increase the flexibility in the
new source review process. First, the process itself was very cumbersome and
viewed by many as unnecessarily complex. Long permitting delays, a source of
tremendous aggravation among plant owners, were common. Second, the cost
imposed on new sources was very high, resulting in slower rates of modernization
than necessary." TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING, supra note 38 at 193. "One
clear problem that cannot be overstated is the complexity of the regulatory system
that EPA implements, particularly with respect to the review of new and modified
sources." RICHARD A. LIROFF, REFORMING AIR POLLUTION REGULATION: THE TOIL
AND TROUBLE OF EPA's BUBBLE, 32 (1986) [hereinafter LIROFF, REFORMING AIR
POLLUTION].
63 The EPA estimates that streamlining NSR can save industry at least $13
million, states and local governments approximately $1.4 million, and the EPA
approximately $116,000 in review costs per year. Statement of Regulatory
Procedures, 63 Fed. Reg. 61,340, 61,369 (Nov. 9, 1998). EPA also notes that
shortening the period of review through streamlining will save industry lost
"opportunity costs." Id.
NEW SOURCE REVIEW
administrative agencies,6 and society because NSR can be expensive
and time-consuming.
The timing of NSR for "new sources" has caused relatively
few problems."s Fossil fuel power plants and other sources that have
the "potential-to-emit" 6 1 over a certain number of tons of a criteria
pollutant is a "major" source67 and must undergo NSR under the
implementing regulations. Sources can avoid becoming a major
source by agreeing not to emit above the major thresholds in a
federally enforceable permit. Incorporating pollution control
technology into the design of a new source allows the source to
consider the fullest range of options, including pollution prevention,
64 The EPA estimates that streamlining NSR can save states and local
governments approximately $1.4 million, and the EPA approximately $116,000 per
year. Id.
65 A new source is any stationary source the construction or modification of
which is commenced after the publication of regulations. Construction is
"commenced" underthe PSD program when a source has the necessary permits and
"either has (i) begun, or caused to begin, a continuous program of physical on-site
construction of the facility or (ii) entered into binding agreements or contractual
obligations, which cannot be canceled or modified without substantial loss to the
owner or operator, to undertake a program of construction of the facility to be
completed within a reasonable time." 42 U.S.C. § 7479(2)(A).
66 A new source calculates its "potential-to-emit" under normal operations,
which includes reductions caused by pollution control equipment. Alabama Power
Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
67 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (1995).
68 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (1995). The requirement that the source be "major;"
that is, emit a certain amount of pollutants is necessary to avoid "an intolerable
burden on both the agency and minor sources." Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 354.
See also A. STANLEY MEIBURG, PROTECT AND ENHANCE: "JURIDICAL
DEMOCRACY" AND THE PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION OF AIR
QUALITY, 355-62 (1991) (criticism of the Alabama Power Court's interpretation
of the Clean Air Act).
69 Sources that agree with federally enforceable limits to avoid NSR are
called "synthetic minors." Memorandum from John S. Seitz, Director, Office of
Air Quality Planning and Standards, to senior staff and agency directors of EPA
2 (Apr. 14, 1998), at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/uatw/pte/lowmarch.pdf.
2000] 15
16 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8
and to avoid the inherent inefficiencies of retrofitting."
The timing ofNSR for existing sources has been troublesome
from the beginning." Congress assumed that existing sources could
install pollution control technology more cheaply and effectively
when the source was already changing its operations for other
reasons." Accordingly, Congress broadly defined "modification" as
"any physical change in, or change in the method of operation of, a
stationary source which increases the amount of any air pollution
emitted by such source or which results in the emission of any air
pollutant not previously emitted.""
Just because a source begins to emit more pollution or makes
a minor change to its operation does not mean, however, it is cost-
effective to install new pollution control technology. First, existing
sources may make any number of small changes that would not make
installing pollution control technology either cheaper or more
feasible. Second, existing sources may simply increase production
and thereby increase the pollution emitted. At least early in the
history of the Clean Air Act, the large number of changes at existing
plants and larger number of existing plants has caused more NSRs at
existing sources than the construction of new sources.74
Congress and EPA have, therefore, limited the definition of
a "modification," which triggers NSR, of an existing source to
70 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (attainment area) (1995).
7 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, § 3.10 (1977). The
EPA has also found that "[t]he issue of NSR applicability proved to be one of the
most difficult and divisive issues" during a 1996 review of NSR. Prevention of
Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New Source Review (NSR),
61 Fed. Reg. 38,250, 38,252 (proposed July 23, 1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
§§ 51 & 52).
72 Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901, 909 (7th Cir. 1990).
42 U.S.C. § 741 1(a)(4) (1995).
74 "Recent studies ofthe PSD program indicate that most PSD permits have
been issued to modifications rather than new sources. This is not surprising,
because the threshold for review ofmodifications is much lower than the threshold
for review of new sources." LIROFF, REFORMING AIR POLLUTION, supra note 62,
at 122 (studies before 1986).
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increase cost-effectiveness by increasing source flexibility. The
courts have also limited the definition of "modification" to reduce its
expansiveness. The increased flexibility has not always led, however,
to economic efficiency for individual sources or society or protected
the environment well. The complexity of the resulting NSR Program
has also caused confusion and potential unfairness in applying NSR
to existing sources.
B. The actual-to-potential methodologv for modifications
In order to ensure that an existing source that substantially
changes its operations undergoes NSR, EPA currently requires
sources to use an "actual-to-potential" methodology in determining
whether the source has made a modification." This methodology
ensures that even sources that reduce their actual emissions must
undergo NSR when they make substantial changes to their operations
but the methodology sweeps very broadly.
The actual-to-potential methodology requires a source to first
determine its "actual emissions" before the modification.' For most
sources this is relatively straightforward. The source simply
calculates its emissions for the two preceding years.
The difficulty arises in calculating the source's "actual
emissions" after the modification. "Actual emissions" are not
necessarily what the source expects to emit. Instead, "actual
7 Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation
Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Standards of
Performance for New Stationary Sources, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,314, 32,314 (July 21,
1992) (to be codified 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, & 60).
76 In 1980, the EPA considered the meaning of "net emissions increase" in
the PSD regulations. In the preamble, the EPA stated that "when calculating
whether a physical change will bring about a significant net increase in emissions,
'the source owner must first quantify the amount of the proposed emissions
increase. This amount will generally be the potential to emit of the new or
modified unit." Puerto Rican Cement Co. v. EPA, 889 F.2d 292, 297 (1st Cir.
1989) (quoting 45 Fed. Reg. 52,577) (emphasis in original).
77 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(21)(ii).
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emissions" are equal to the source's "potential-to-emit."" A source's
"potential-to-emit" is the "maximum capacity of a stationary source
to emit a pollutant under its physical and operational design. Any
physical or operational limitation on the capacity of the source to emit
a pollutant, including air pollution control equipment and restrictions
on hours or operation ... shall be treated as part of its design if the
limitation would be federally enforceable."" Sources "often ...
accept federally enforceable limits on post-modification emissions or
operations to avoid major NSR.""
The actual-to-potential methodology could potentially include
almost every source on a regular basis. Large manufacturing factories
and other sources undergo constant change. Parts break or wear out
and must be replaced. Without these changes, the source might have
to curtail or shut down. The source changes production methodology
or start to manufacture new products. All these changes might
require the source to undergo NSR under the actual-to-potential
methodology unless the source accepts federally enforceable limits.
Furthermore, many changes to an existing source will reduce
actual emissions. Reduced production, new production methods,'
and new fuels 2 may all lead to a reduction in the actual air pollution
emitted. If existing sources can make these changes without
undergoing NSR, then the environmental benefits of installing new
pollution control technology will be lost."
The actual-to-potential methodology benefits the environment
because more sources must undergo NSR and possibly install the
latest pollution control technology ifnecessary. Unlimited, however,
the actual-to-potential methodology is costly.
78 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(21).
7 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(4).
so Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New
Source Review (NSR), 61 Fed. Reg. 38,250, 38,254 (proposed July 23, 1996) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 51 & 52).
81 BRYNER, supra note 4, at 4.
82 Id. at 82 (sulfur content of coal).
83 Id. at 256-257.
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C. Limiting NSR
1. Limiting NSR by limiting the "physical changes" that may
constitute a "modification"
Congress, EPA, and the courts have limited, therefore, the
reach of the NSR Program. One way EPA has done so is by limiting
the definition of"physical change." Routine maintenance, repair, and
replacement of parts at a source do not meet the definition of
"physical change."" This definition avoids the danger of existing
sources undergoing repetitive and unproductive NSRs but is one of
the main wellsprings of the Clean Air Act's new source bias.
"Maintenance, repair, and replacement which the
Administrator determines to be routine for a source category" is not
a "physical change" that can form the basis of a "modification."ss
Including such routine activities might require a source to undergo
NSR for "[t]he most mundane activities at an industrial facility (even
the repair or replacement of a single leaky pipe, or an insignificant
change in the way that pipe is utilized)."" The permitting authority
makes the determination on a case-by-case basis." It considers the
cost, magnitude and nature of the project." Solid legislative intent
supports EPA: "Congress chose not to subject existing plants to the
requirements of NSPS and PSD."89 Good economic and
84 Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901, 909 (7th Cir. 1990).
as 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.14(e) & 52.21(b)(2)(iii).
86 Memorandum from John S. Seitz, Director, Office ofAir Quality Planning
and Standards, Office of Air and Radiation, EPA, to Director, Air, Pesticides and
Toxics et al. 2 (July 1, 1994), at http://www.epa.gov/region7/programs/artdlair/
title5/t5memos/pcpguide.pdf. (the EPA relied on this document when proposing
changes to NSR in 1996).
87 Wisconsin Elec. Power, 893 F.2d at 910.
88 Id. at 910-11.
89 Id. at 909. The EPA recognizes that routine changes can be "desirable for
economic reasons and to assure a reliable supply of electricity." Requirements for
Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans; Approval and
Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Standards of Performance for New
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environmental sense also supports EPA: Subjecting existing sources
to constant NSR for minor maintenance, repairs, and replacements is
expensive and unlikely to result in the installation of new pollution
control technology.
Nonetheless, the distinction between routine and non-routine
maintenance, repair, and maintenance is theoretically illusory because
economics motivates both types of changes. 90 EPA states that sources
make non-routine changes "to increase reliability, lower operating
costs, or improve operational characteristics of the unit and do so in
order that they may improve their market position."9'
These statements are as true for routine as non-routine
maintenance, repair, and replacement. Industry expends money to
maintain or improve economic efficiency.92 In 1998, EPA realized
that "[flor consumer-driven industries, demand is inextricably
intertwined with changes that improve a source's ability to utilize its
capacity; thus it cannot be said that demand growth is an
'independent factor,' separable from a given physical or operational
change. Modifications which affect operational characteristics of a
unit are not made without reason, and the most likely reason for an
economically competitive source to undertake changes is to enable it
to create or respond to increased demand."9 3 Investments without any
perceived economic benefit to the company are not made. Buildings
turn gray from lack of paint. Equipment is cannibalized for
replacements. Slowly the plant stops operating.
Stationary Sources, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,314, 32,327 (July 21, 1992) (to be codified 40
C.F.R. §§ 51, 52, & 60).
90 The EPA knew from comments that distinguishing between routine and
non-routine changes, changes from independent factors and resulting from
modifications would be difficult. Id.
91 Notice of Availability; Alternatives for New Source Review (NSR)
Applicability for Major, 63 Fed. Reg. 39,857, 39,860 (July 24, 1998).
92 Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation
Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Standards of
Performance for New Stationary Sources, 57 Fed. Reg. at 32,327.
93 Notice of Availability; Alternatives for New Source Review (NSR)
Applicability for Major, 63 Fed. Reg at 39,860-61.
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The only viable distinction economically is the amount of the
source's expenditure. If the source expends a large amount, then it
should go through new source review. If the source does not, then it
should not. This obviously discourages large expenditures to improve
a source.
Furthermore, the distinction between routine and non-routine
maintenance, repair, and replacement partially depends on how the
change affects a source's operation. If the change improves the
source's reliability or market position, then EPA will more likely find
the change "non-routine." This discourages innovation.
EPA has limited the physical changes that fall under the term
"physical change" by excluding routine changes at a source. This
commonsense limitation avoids subjecting sources to constant NSR,
but helps create the new source bias in the Clean Air Act.
2. Limiting NSRby imposing a significance requirement and
allowing "bubbles"
EPA has further reduced the number of facilities that must
undergo NSR. First, only "major modifications" must undergo NSR.
The PSD regulations define "major modification" as "any physical
change in or change in the method of operation of a major stationary
source that would result in a significant net emissions increase of any
pollutant subject to regulation under the Act.", 4 "Significant" is
defined in terms of tons per year of criteria pollutant emitted." This
means that modifications that result in small increases in the source's
potential-to-emit escape NSR.
Second, EPA allows atemporal and geographic "bubble" over
a source in an attainment area." A complex algorithm calculates
94 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(2)(i).
9s 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(23)(i).
96 "However, a company can avoid or reduce these requirements when it
compensates for those increases by reducing emissions from other points within
that source and thereby earning ERCs. Because this trading approach causes the
net emissions from the entire source to stay at the same level as they were before
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whether a "net emissions increase" has occurred:
the amount by which the sum of the following
exceeds zero:
(a) Any increase in actual emissions
from a particular change or change in
method of operation at a stationary
source; and
(b) Any other increases and decreases
in actual emissions at the source that
are contemporaneous with the
particular change and are otherwise
creditable.
(ii) An increase or decrease in actual emissions is
contemporaneous if....
(iii) An increase or decrease in actual emissions is
creditable only if the Administrator has not relied on
it in issuing a permit ....
(v) An increase in actual emissions is creditable only
to the extent that the new level of actual emissions
exceeds the old emissions.
(vi) A decrease in actual emissions is creditable only
to the extent that:
(a) The old level of actual emissions or the old
level of allowable emissions, whichever is
lower, exceeds the new level of actual
emissions;
(b) It is federally enforceable ....
(c) It has approximately the same qualitative
significance for public health and welfare as
that attributed to the increase from the
the modifications, it is commonly known as netting. " LIROFF, REFORMING AIR
POLLUTION, supra note 62, at 6.
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particular change."
This algorithm allows a source to increase emissions from one
part of its facility but avoid NSR by decreasing emissions from
another part within a certain time frame. The bubble lessens the cost
of pollution control by reducing the number of NSRs. More
importantly economically, individual sources have the flexibility to
choose pollution reductions in the most cost-effective manner." They
may cease emitting entirely from one production line or "voluntarily"
control another production line in order to emit more from a different
line if it is economically efficient to do so."
Still the bubble has proven controversial because it allows
sources to avoid NSR.'0o The source may therefore avoid installing
certain new pollution control technology with possible benefits to the
environment. The counter argument is that the source must reduce
some emissions in order to avoid NSR.
Empirical data on the effect of the bubble is scarce but
suggests that sources have used the bubble to avoid NSR.' The lack
97 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(3).
98 "The innovation of the bubble concept consists in allowing several
sources of emissions to define themselves as a bubble.... Environmental policy
is not interested in the pollution through an individual stack, but in the impact on
environmental quality of a bundle of sources ... .The advantage of the bubble
consists in cost reduction. By allowing abatement where it is cheapest, less
resources have to be used for pollution abatement. Also, the bubble concept
introduces an incentive to reduce the costs of abatement and to search for new
technologies at the decentralized units of the economy. It thus prevents the most
important disadvantage of the regulatory approach, namely treating technology as
a constant." SIEBERT, supra note 7, at 143. See also RICHARD A. LIROFF,
REFORMING AIR POLLUTION REGULATION: THE TOIL AND TROUBLE OF EPA's
BUBBLE (1986) (detailed discussion of the pros-and-cons of the bubble).
99 SIEBERT, supra note 7, at 143.
*0 Chevron U.S.A., Inc.. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984) (resolving the legal questions about EPA's bubble policy).
101 People still debate, of course, the practical importance of the bubble. "In
practice, netting has had a limited impact. Even when unencumbered by judicial
restraints, the program benefits only those modified sources having internal offsets
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of empirical data makes it impossible to determine whether this is
good, but the determination would seem to depend upon how much
the sources are saving economically, on whether sources are honestly
reducing actual emissions elsewhere at their facility, and on how the
sources would have reduced emissions if there were no bubble. The
potential for manipulation by sources is great in the absence of good
monitoring data.10 2
Requiring that any modification result in a "significant net
emissions increase" has increased flexibility. The price has been
reducing the number of sources that must undergo NSR.
3. Limiting NSR by including cyclical increases and
increases in demand in the baselining of actual emissions
A source must determine its baseline of actual emissions in
order to determine whether a modification results in a "net emissions
increase." Setting a baseline inevitably produces winners and
losers."0 3 EPA requires most sources to use the immediately
preceding two years to determine the baseline, but allows some
available to them. New sources locating in an area for the first time would be
granted no relief. And though ultimately supporting the program, the court initially
took a dim view of using the netting program in nonattainment areas, seeing it as
a threat to improving air quality." TIETENBERG, supra note 38, at 95.
102 "Highly accurate emissions data is one of the pillars of the Acid Rain
Program's operations." Joseph Kruger et al., A Tale of Two Revolutions, in
EMISSIONS TRADING: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY'S NEW APPROACH 3, 27, 115, 119
(Richard F. Kosobud ed., 2000). "Any effective 'cap and trade' system such as
that embodied in Title IV requires an accurate method for measuring emissions and
tracking allowances." A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR: THE
U.S. ACID RAIN PROGRAM 9 (2000)(this book is an expansion of Paul Joskow and
Richard Schmalensee's article, The Political Economy of Market-Based
Environmental Policy: The US. A cidRain Program; Joskow & Schmalensee, Acid
Rain Program, supra note 3).
103 Richard F. Kosobud, Emissions Trading Emerges from the Shadows, in
EMissIoNS TRADING: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY'S NEW APPROACH 3, 27 (Richard
F. Kosobud ed., 2000).
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sources to use a different time period if appropriate.104 By 1996, EPA
found that "[t]his provision has been a source of confusion and
uneven implementation."'o
Actual emissions normally equals the "average rate .. . at
which the unit actually emitted the pollutant during a two-year period
which precedes the particular date and which is representative of
normal source operation."' 0 6 In the WEPCO Rule EPA allowed
utilities to use any two of the previous five years to establish the
baseline because "annual variability in climatic or economic
conditions" might change the emissions from an electric utility
source.07 Sources can now "use . .. a different time period upon a
determination that it is more representative of normal source
operations."' 8 EPA can approve a "different two year consecutive
period within 10 years after the change." 09
4. Limiting NSR for Power Plants by changing how sources'
potential-to-emit is calculated for "like-kind" replacements
Prior to 1990, EPA determined the potential to emit from non-
routine like kind replacements "compar[ing] actual pre-renovation
104 Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New
Source Review (NSR), 61 Fed. Reg. 38,250, 38,251 (proposed July 23, 1996) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 51& 52).
05 Id. at 38,259.
106 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(21)(ii).
07 Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation
Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Standards of
Performance for New Stationary Sources, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,314, 32,325 (July 21,
1992) (to be codified 40 C.F.R. §§ 51, 52, & 60). Writers have criticized these
exceptions from the start. Richard E. Ayres & Richard W. Parker, The Proposed
WEPCO Rule: Making the Problem Fit the Solution, 22 ENVTL. L. REV. 10201,
10208-09 (1992).
10 Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation
Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Standards of
Performance for New Stationary Sources, 57 Fed. Reg. at 32,325.
09 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(33).
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emissions with potential post-renovation emissions""o using its
"actual-to-potential" methodology described above."' In Wisconsin
Electric Power Co. v. Reilly"' (WEPCO), however, the Court struck
down this interpretation and held that a power plant's potential-to-
emit had not increased enough to trigger NSR. EPA "acquiesc[ed]"
to the WEPCO Court's decision,"' and later promulgated its WEPCO
Rule." 4 The WEPCO decision and Rule increased the new source
bias of the Clean Air Act.
The WEPCO Court gave deference to EPA in a complex
area"s while noting the need not to upset the "economic-
environmental balance" contemplated by Congress and implemented
by EPA."' It therefore rejected the power company's argument that
replacing steam drums, air heaters and other items in order to
renovate a power plant with "like-kind" replacements was not a
"physical change.""' The renovation activities fell under the plain
language of the statute."' Furthermore, acceptance of the argument
"would open vistas of indefinite immunity from the provisions of
110 Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 1990).
III Id.
112 Id. at 909.
"3 Letter from William G. Rosenberg, Assistant Administrator for Air and
Radiation, EPA, to John Boston, President, Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (June
8, 1990), at http://www.epa.gov/region7/programs/artd/nsr/nsrmemos/wepco.pdf.
114 Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal ofImplementation
Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Standards of
Performance for New Stationary Sources, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,314, 32,314 (July 21,
1992) (to be codified 40 C.F.R. §§ 51, 52, & 60). (WEPCO Rule"). See also
Ayres & Parker, supra note 107, at 10207 (the WEPCO Rule was a political
compromise involving the EPA, the Department of Energy, and the White House);
Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans;
Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Standards of Performance
for New Stationary Sources, 57 Fed. Reg. at 32,314-16 (the EPA initially limited
the application of the WEPCO Rule to electric utilities).
"15 Wisconsin Elec. Power, 893 F.2d at 910.
116 Id. at 909.
117 Id.
"18 Id. at 907.
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NSPS and PSD.""'
The WEPCO Court rejected, however, EPA's application of
"potential-to-emit" to a "like-kind" replacement. In doing so it
tersely relied'20 on Alabama Power Co. v. Costle.12' The Alabama
Power Court had rejected EPA's interpretation of "potential to emit"
to mean "uncontrolled emissions" with respect to new sources.122 The
Congressional purpose in the Clean Air Act was to "require
preconstruction review and a permit before major amounts of
emissions were released into the air." 23 The Court also found that
"Congress was presumably ... aware of the high rate of effectiveness
with which control equipment eliminates pollutants from unprocessed
industrial emissions." Noting that the legislative history "is
extensive, complex, and conflicting"1 25 and despite "some support"
for EPA's position, 26 the Alabama Power Court nonetheless
concluded that "the overall legislative history does not support EPA's
position" and remanded the regulations for an interpretation
consistent with interpreting "potential-to-emit" to mean controlled
emissions."i27
Extending the Alabama Power ruling on potential-to-emit for
new sources to modification of existing sources was doubtful
statutorily and certainly increased the new source bias of the Clean
Air Act for utilities. First, the Alabama Power Court had relied on
the Congressional purpose to "require preconstruction review and a
permit before major amounts of emissions were released into the
air."l28 The purpose of requiring NSR for modification of sources
already emitting major amounts of pollutants is somewhat different.
19 Id. at 909.
120 Id. at 917-18.
121 Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
12n Id. at 353.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 354.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 355.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 353.
2000] 27
28 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8
It, "quite clearly, is to assure that new source performance standards
[and BACT] are applied to installations modifying operations to
increase or change the mix of pollutants." 29 Non-routine "like-kind"
replacements at a power plant can result in a power plant continuing
operation and continuing to emit major amounts of pollutants in the
air when they would otherwise stop doing so.' Furthermore, non-
routine, like-kind replacements can involve replacing important
equipment and major expenditures. This is precisely when Congress
assumed that installing pollution control technology would be most
feasible and economical.' 3 1
The WEPCO decision and Rule increased the new source bias
of the Clean Air Act for familiar reasons. Just as with routine
maintenance, sources will have an incentive to replace aging
equipment with like-kind equipment in order to avoid NSR. This
discourages innovation and prolongs the life of aging plants.
The WEPCO Rule limits the expansive reach of EPA's
definition of "potential-to-emit." It has had important, negative
effects in the electric utility industry as shown in Section III below.
D. EPA further complicated and limited NSR review by
making more exceptions to NSR to encourage pollution
control technology improvements or fuel-switching
EPA has also adopted several exceptions to NSR designed to
encourage pollution control technology improvements or fuel-
switching. These exceptions reduce the number of facilities that must
undergo NSR and introduce additional complexity to the process. In
some cases the exceptions are unpromulgated and rely on the intent
of the source in deciding whether the exception applies. This
129 RODGERS, supra note 71, at § 3.10.
130 Seitz, supra note 86, at 11 (example 3).
131 Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901, 909 (7th Cir. 1990).
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increases the possibility of unfairness from uneven implementation.13 2
1. Pollution Control Projects
EPA excludes pollution control projects (PCPs) "from major
NSR . .. at existing sources."'33 The determination of whether a
project is a PCP depends on the intent of the source in doing the
project. This is counterintuitive economically and unenforceable in
practice.
The goal is to support "pollution control and prevention
projects and strategies."' 34 "[Bona fide pollution control projects are
not subject to major NSRrequirements for the simple reason that they
result in a reduction in annual emissions at the source."l 35 A PCP
might be a "major modification"requiring the sourceto undergoNSR
because the project results in a "significant" change in the source's
potential-to-emit a criteria pollutant. For example, a PCP might be
when a source "switch[es] to a less polluting coating, solvent, or
refrigerant."1'3 The source's "potential-to-emit" might well increase
requiring NSR, but the switch itself might improve air quality by
reducing actual emissions. The need to undergo NSR would
discourage the source from making the switch thereby losing the
possible air quality improvements from the switch.
On the other hand, EPA recognizes the danger of the PCP
exception. "Virtually every modernization or upgrade project at an
existing industrial facility which reduces inputs and lowers unit costs
has the concurrent effect of lowering an emissions rate per unit of
132 "Therefore, industrial polluters were faced with different levels of
enforcement of the standards depending on their location. Furthermore, since the
standards were enforced based on local pollution, by building higher smokestacks
these polluters were able to send their air pollution to other localities and still meet
the local standard." FREEDMAN & JAGGI, AIR AND WATER POLLUTION, supra note
7, at 139.
133 Seitz, supra note 86, at 1.
14 Id. atl11.
135 Id. at 2.
136 Id
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fuel, raw material or output."' EPA continued that "it is clear that
these major capital investments in industrial equipment are the very
types of projects that Congress intended to address in the new source
,,138Thsmodification provisions. These projects "increase capacity,
decrease production costs, or improve marketability."l 39 In excluding
PCPs, therefore, EPA has weakened NSR.
In order to avoid weakening NSR, EPA requires that the
source have the intent to benefit the environment with the project.'40
For example "[a] source plans to physically renovate and upgrade an
existing process line by making certain changes to existing process.
... Following the changes, the source will expand production and
manufacture and market a new product line. The project will cause
an increase in economic efficiency of the line."'41 EPA would refuse
to apply the PCP exception to this situation because "[o]n balance,
the project does not have clearly evident pollution control aspects,
and the resultant decrease in the per-product emissions rate . .. is
incidental to the project."'42
EPA built in several more safeguards to the PCP process.
First, permitting authorities make the decision of whether a project
qualifies as a PCP on a "case-by-case basis" if certain "safeguards"
and "procedural steps" are met.143 There is no blanket exception for
PCPs.
Second, the PCP must, on balance, be "environmentally
beneficial," and an Air Quality Impacts Assessment must be
conducted.'4 4 For a PCP to be environmentally beneficial there must
be a decrease in actual emissions for the PCP to improve the
environment. A decrease in a source's "potential-to-emit" provides
137 Id. at 11.
13n Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 19.
141 Id
142 Id
143 Id. at 2.
144 Id. at 7-8.
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no evidence that actual emissions will decrease.145
Third, the EPA initially limited the PCP exception to existing
sources.' 4 This protection is necessary because new sources have no
actual emissions until they have been built. They have only potential
emissions. Allowing a new source to use the PCP exception would
allow the source to avoid NSR where it has only reduced potential
emissions and not actual emissions. It is, therefore, not
environmentally beneficial in the same sense as a PCP at an existing
source. Furthermore, allowing a new source to use the PCP exception
to avoid NSR means that the source need not install BACT or LAER
or even meet NSPS for the changed process.147
Despite these safeguards, the PCP exception is doubtful. A
competitive business cannot make money through altruistic
investments in air quality improvements. It seems naive to believe
that a source would make large investments in pollution control
without some economic benefit to itself. If so, then the intent test
cannot fairly distinguish between PCPs and non-PCPs: both benefit
the environment and both provide economic benefit to the source.
145 For example, Illinois rejected a project as a PCP where a source was
willing to commit to reduce potential VOC emissions to 18 tons per year.
Approval and Implementation of Plans; Illinois, 64 Fed. Reg. 2577, 2578-79 (Jan.
15, 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 52). Illinois rejected this because it
"confused the terms "actual emissions" and "potential to emit." Reducing
'potential emissions' does not always equate to a real environmental benefit,
especially when, in fact, [the source] does not actually emit near its potential to
emit." Id. at 2578.
146 Seitz, supra note 86, at 1-2. The Clean Air Act defines "existing source"
in the context of the NSPS Program that establishes standards of performance for
new sources and modifications to existing sources as "any stationary source other
than a new source." 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(6) (1995).
147 The EPA has subsequently expanded its PCP exception, however, to
include at least one new source with a permit even where operations had not
commenced. Letter from Cynthia A. King, Assistant Regional Counsel, U. S.
Environmental Protection Agency Region V to the Michigan Department of
Environmental Quality 1 (May 19, 1999) (on file with author). The application of
this expansion to other new sources is unknown because it was part of a lawsuit
settlement. Id.
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Furthermore, the balancing process used by EPA is undefined and
nebulous. This might result in different results for similar situations
depending on factors extraneous to the validity of the project's PCP
status.
The PCP exception weakens NSR for what seems a worthy
goal. The reliance on the subjective intent of a source and
counterintuitive economic assumptions makes, however, the
exception of doubtful benefit to the environment.
2. Innovative Control Technology
EPA has promulgated regulations allowing a source to install
Innovative Control Technology (ICT).'4 8 The ICT exception allows
a source to avoid installing BACT or LAER in order install ICT to
improve pollution control technology. It provides stringent
safeguards to ensure improvement in air quality but is rarely used.
The ICT exception seeks to encourage new pollution control
technologies "that [have] not been adequately demonstrated in
practice, but would have a substantial likelihood of achieving greater
continuous emissions reduction than any control system in current
practice."' 49 Technology-based regulations reduce the incentives for
sources to innovate because innovation leads to lower emissions
rates.'o If connected with higher costs, then the source has no motive
to search out new technologies. This requires the regulators to seek
148 42 U.S.C. § 7411(j) (1995) (providing the statutory basis for this waiver).
149 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(19).
150 "Delegating flexibility to the emitters to make relevant choices in light of
their detailed knowledge of their production and control possibilities opens up
another avenue for cost savings. ... Command-and-control regimes have been
criticized because they act to stifle this innovation incentive [to reduce costs
through new ideas]. Should an emitter be creative in these circumstances and thus
risk having lower emission rates imposed?" Mary A. Gade & Roger A. Kanerva,
Emissions Trading Designs in the OTAG Process, in EMisSIONS TRADING:
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY'S NEW APPROACH, supra note 103, at 11.
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out and advocate new technologies for industry to use."' First, the
technology-forcing aspects of the BACT requirement may be
relatively weak. If the permitting authority does not require a source
to undertake a thorough review of available technologies, especially
emerging technologies or technologies for similar but not identical
sources and industries, then a source merely installs the air pollution
control technology that identical sources have. Second, if the ICT
fails, then the source may be subject to significant civil penalties for
violating the Clean Air Act.
EPA sets strict substantive and procedural requirements for an
ICT waiver."s The source must prove that "[t]he owner or operator
agrees to achieve a level of continuous emissions reduction
equivalent to [BACT]."'" If the ICT fails, then the Administrator
may allow the source or modification up to an additional 3 years to
meet the requirement for the application of BACT.'54
Procedurally the ICT exception requires, among other things,
a public comment period.' Not surprisingly, sources have rarely
used the ICT process because of these stringent requirements and the
need to meet BACT if the ICT fails.'15
The ICT exception protects the environment better than the
PCP process. On the other hand, it appears to be rarely used.
151 "The government will try to prove that new technologies are possible,
whereas the entrepreneur will use his energy to show that these new technologies
are not feasible or not economical... . Whereas in a market economy it is the role
of firms to find new technologies, given our scenario, firms will relinquish this
function to the government." SIEBERT, supra note 7, at 133.
152 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(v).
1s3 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(2)(ii).
IS4 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(2)(iii).
1ss 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(v).
156 An online search of EPA files revealed few ICT waivers. Memorandum
from Ed Lillis, Chief of Permits Program Branch, EPA, to Kenneth Eng, Chief of
Air Compliance Branch, EPA (Aug. 20, 1991) at http://www.epa.gov/region7/
programs/artd/air/nsr/nsrmemos/Kamine.pdf (comments on a proposed ICT
Waiver).
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3. Fuel-switching and clean coal technology
Congress and EPA have carved out PCP exceptions from
NSR for switching fuels"' and clean coal technology."' Individually
these exceptions may have merit, but collectively the other exceptions
demonstrate the complexity of the task facing EPA and the difficulty
of adapting command-and-control regulations to every conceivable
situation.
E. NSR has become increasingly complicated, less protective
of the environment, and potentially unfair since its inception
The Clean Air Act could conceivably require a very large
number of existing sources making "modifications" to undergo NSR,
but Congress, EPA and the courts have greatly limited the number to
encourage economic-efficiency and, in some instances, improvements
in pollution control technology. The result is a complex system
without any bright lines. Application of NSR to a particular air
emissions source depends on numerous factors: the quality of the air
surrounding it, the pollutant emitted, the amount actually emitted, the
amount that potentially might be emitted if the plant operated full
time, the type of source, the date the source was built or modified, the
available or possibly soon-to-be-available pollution control
technology, and the regulatory agency with authority over the source.
The next section will examine whether the balance among
environmental protection, economic growth and energy needs has
worked in the electric utility industry.
III. THE WEPCO RULE HAS WORSENED THE PROBLEM OF
GRANDFATHERED POWER PLANTS
The EPA WEPCO Rule increased the new source bias of the
157 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.21(b)(21)(2)(iii)(b)-(e) & (32) (a form of a PCP).
158 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.21(b)(32)(iii)-(iv) & (34)-(38).
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Clean Air Act by excluding routine maintenance, repair, and
replacement from the definition of "modification" and by redefining
"potential-to-emit" for non-routine, like-kind replacements. The
result is that grandfathered, coal-fired power plants continue to
seriously degrade the environment thirty years after the passage ofthe
Clean Air Act.
Coal-fired power plants are one of the major industrial
polluters in the United States.s' Grandfathered, coal-fired power
plants especially remain a serious threat to the environment.
Grandfathered power plants have few pollution controls. 0 One study
estimates that requiring "grandfathered" coal fired electric utility
plants to comply with new source standards would reduce NOx
emissions by 18% in the nation and 51% of all SO2 national
emissions.16' Regulators have not succeeded in reducing SO 2 at many
159 "Fossil fuel-burning electric utility plants are the largest industrial
producers of air pollution in the United States." FREEDMAN & JAGGI, AIR AND
WATER POLLUTION, supra note 7, at 41.
160 Before 1970 few, if any, controls were required for air emissions; simple
landfill disposal fly ash was permitted; and condenser heat was rejected directly
into water bodies via once-through cooling systems. RICHARD D. BROWN ET AL.,
POLLUTION CONTROL AT ELECTRIC POWER STATIONS: COMPARISONS FOR U.S. AND
EUROPE 9 (1983).
161 U.S. Public Interest Research Group, LethalLoophole: A Comprehensive
Report ofAmerica's Dirtiest Power Plants and the Loophole That Allows Them to
Pollute, Executive Summary 1 (1998), at http://pirg.org/reports/environ/lethal98.
The academic literature is equally startling. ". . . [B]y 1985 83 percent of power
plant SO2 emissions came from generating units not meeting the 1971 NSPS."
Joskow & Schmalensee, AcidRain Program, supra note 3, at 45. "By 1990, over
two-thirds of acid rain precursors emitted by power plants were emitted by plants
constructed before 1970." Id. Some grandfathered power plants have shut down.
EPA states that if "a source which has been shut down is subject to PSD review
upon reactivation depends on whether the shutdown is considered permanent. EPA
evaluates the permanence of shutdowns based upon the intent of the owner or
operator." Memorandum from John B. Rasnic, Director, Stationary Source
Compliance Division, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, to Douglas
M. Skie, Chief, Air Programs Branch, 1 (Nov. 19, 1991), at http://www.epa.gov/
region7/programs/artd/air/nsr/nsrmemos/watertown.pdf [hereinafter
Memorandum].
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power plants.'62 Power plants have also not significantly reduced
NOx.'6 1 Success in reducing particulates has come through new
technology.'64
Grandfathered power plants remain controversial. EPA and
many northeastern States blame grandfathered power plants in the
Midwest for continuing acid rain and smog problems on the East
Coast.165 In 1999 EPA started major litigation to force electric
utilities in Ohio16 6 to install additional pollution control technology
on certain "grandfathered" coal-fired power plants. Fossil fired
power plants, especially coal-fired power plants, contribute to
possible global warming. 67  Inner city, especially grandfathered,
162 "In reducing sulfur dioxide emissions, electric utility plants and
companies have not been very successful. Although there was an overall reduction
in sulfur dioxide emissions of 28% for the plants in this study, technologically,
these plants were capable of achieving a much greater improvement. It appeared
that companies that made a concerted effort to reduce these emissions (e.g.,
Commonwealth Edison and Northern States Power) were quite successful in their
endeavors. However, since the law did not require such success, most companies
appear to have chosen to reduce sulfur dioxide by only enough to meet the
minimum standard. If the new Clean Air Act is going to be successful in reducing
sulfur dioxide emissions, it must recognize that many firms will not do more than
they have to do to clean up." FREEDMAN & JAGGI, AIR AND WATER POLLUTION,
supra note 7, at 140.
163 NOx was reduced only 8 percent between 1975 and 1988. Id.
164 "The use of state-of-the-art electric precipitators and the burning of
cleaner fuel have led to this reduction [in particulate emissions]. However, there
are still a few plants that could improve on their performance, and this may require
a push from regulators." Id. at 139.
165 Andrew C. Revkin, In New Tactic, State Aims to Sue Utilities over Coal
Pollution, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1999, at Al; Paul Zielbauer, Connecticut to Sue
Coal-Fired Power Plants in Five States, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1999 at B314.
166 D. Stout, 7 Utilities Sued by U.S. on Charges of Polluting Air, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 1999, at Al.
167 David Mallery, Clean Energy and the Kyoto Protocol: Applying
Environmental Controls to Grandfathered Power Facilities, 10 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 469, 472 (1999).
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power plants raise environmental justice concerns.' Coal-fired
power plants are also major emitters of toxic substances such as
mercury." Congressional calls to require grandfathered power plants
168 Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, If Your Grandfather Could Pollute, So Can
You: Environmental "Grandfather Clauses" and Their Role in Environmental
Inequity, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 131 (1995); Eileen Gauna, Major Sources of
Criteria Pollutants in NonattainmentAreas: Balancing the Goals ofthe Clean Air,
Environmental Justice, and Industrial Development, 3 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 379, 380 (1996).
Emissions trading might result in more pollution in poor and minority
neighborhoods than traditional command-and-control regulations. Older air
pollution sources might avoid NSR and continue to operate without air pollution
control equipment. The older sources might also purchase emission rights from
sources with lower marginal costs of control. On the other hand, older sources
might occasionally have a lower marginal cost of pollution control. They would
reduce their emissions if they could sell their emission rights for more than their
marginal cost of pollution control. The effect of intersource trading might differ
between industries, types ofsources, and between individual sources. Only careful
empirical study can determine the effect of intersource trading on poor or minority
community.
Most importantly, avoiding some costs ofpollution control might enable
a source to continue to operate that would otherwise close. Continued operation
might provide many benefits to the poor or minority community in property tax-
base, income taxes, employment, the ability to remedy other environmental
problems, and other tangible and intangible ways. See generally WILLIAM J.
WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR
(1996)(the author demonstrates how social structural factors are important for
understanding the joblessness and other experiences of the inner-city poor) .
Market-based controls might, therefore, allow more pollution than other
approaches but provide a net benefit in welfare to poor and minority communities.
See generally Todd Adams, Environmental Justice and the Limits of Disparate
Impact Analysis, 16 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 417 (1999) (expressing skepticism
concerning the use of disparate impact analysis to evaluate the siting of polluting
facilities because of this potential net benefit). Restarting heavily polluting power
plants in heavily populated areas causes, however, concerns regardless of the race
or class of the surrounding community.
169 "The largest source ofmercury emissions on a national level are coal-fired
power plants (33%), municipal waste incinerators (18%), and medical waste
incinerators (10%)." More than 98% of the mercury released to Ohio's air and
water comes from air emissions because 90% of its electricity comes from coal-
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to retrofit have not succeeded.170
The WEPCO Rule wreaks particular havoc on the
environment because of the economics of the power industry.
Pollution control technology is very expensive for coal-fired power
plants."' Some economists have estimated that pollution control
costs twenty-five percent of a new power plant's construction costs.17 2
The cost of retrofitting grandfathered power plants with pollution
control equipment may be particularly expensive for utilities because
the plants have depreciated."' Just as requiring catalytic converters
on new automobiles resulted in people using their cars without
catalytic converters longer, the WEPCO Rule has greatly encouraged
the electric utilities to extend the life of existing grandfathered power
plants.174
Application ofthe distinction between routine and non-routine
maintenance, repair, and replacement is very doubtful in fifty-year-
fired power plants. National Wildlife Federation, Clean the Rain, Clean the Lakes
16 (1999) at http://www.nwf.org/nwf/greatlakes (visited Apr. 2001).
170 Clean Air: Bill Would Close Grandfather Loophole, NAT'L JOURNAL'S
DAILY ENERGY BRIEFING, (Oct. 4, 1999).
171 "The grandfather clause is an incentive to use old technology. The state
of the art requirement encrusts the given technology and does not introduce a
decentralized incentive to improve abatement and production technology. And the
closing off of a region to a newcomer reduces mobility and implies efficiency
losses." SIEBERT, supra 7, at 137.
172 "With respect to new facilities, in 1979 about 25% ofnew coal-fired plant
construction costs were for environmental equipment designed to bring the new
facilities into compliance with regulatory standards." BROWN ET AL., supra, note
159, at 76 (citations omitted). Some of the increased costs were the capital costs
of cooling towers and add-on pollution control equipment, the operating costs of
the same, and even the cost of disposing sludge from sulfur dioxide scrubbers. Id.
173 "When new legislation, such as amendments to the Clean Air Act, set
new requirements for stack emissions and power plants, utilities may be forced to
make additional investments on existing power plants by retrofitting pollution
control equipment on those plants. Since these old plants have been used
continually and for the most part depreciated, such new regulations can have the
effect of requiring companies to increase their capital investment in the old plants
by as much as 45% and operating cost by as much as 100%." Id.
174 Joskow & Schmalensee, Acid Rain Program, supra note 3, at 44-45.
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old, grandfathered power plants. Replacing many types of equipment
necessarily involves upgrading the equipment to newer, better and
more economically efficient equipment because the older equipment
is not made or does not meet new public health codes.
EPA reliance on the intent of the utility in shutting-down the
plant to determine whether the plants must undergo NSR when
restarting"s has not improved the situation. This gives electric
utilities a strong incentive to never permanently shut down any
grandfathered power plant. Instead, the electric utility "temporarily"
shut down plants to wait for more favorable economic conditions."'
Excluding routine maintenance, repair and replacement from
the definition of modification and the WEPCO Rule significantly
prolongs the lives of grandfathered power plants and their pollution.
The history of the WEPCO Rule should serve as an example of how
not to regulate an industry.
IV. THE ACID RAIN TRADING PROGRAM SHOWS PROMISE
BUT HAS ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC LIMITATIONS
The very existence of the Acid Rain Trading Program
represents a major victory for environmentalists. Initially the Acid
Rain Trading Program has shown promise in its implementation. The
17s "Applicability of PSD to Watertown Power Plant, South Dakota,
Shutdown for 9 years." Memorandum, supra note 160, at 1.
176 Electrical utilities have traditionally recovered the fair and reasonable
costs of generating electricity, including that of pollution control technology. "[I]t
must be recognized that, given the nature ofthe regulation process, electric utilities
are able to extract from their customers the additional costs resulting from pollution
abatement activities. Therefore, if regulatory authorities are willing to raise utility
rates to compensate the utilities for pollution-related expenditures, the long-term
economic effects of such expenditures will be mitigated to some extent."
FREEDMAN & JAGGI, AIR AND WATER POLLUTION, supra note 7, at 209. "Electric
utilities earn a fair and reasonable rate of return on costs incurred in the
construction ofpower plants. These costs are borne by the consumer." BROWN ET
AL, supra note 159, at 76. EPA and the courts should be, therefore, more willing,
not less, willing to require electric utilities to undergo NSR. The power industry
has a powerful trump card, however, in the demand for energy in the United States.
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Acid Rain Trading Program also shows, however, the economic costs
and environmental limitations of market-based regulations.
The Acid Rain Trading Program is a major success for
environmentalists because it requires power plants to cut SO2
emissions.. in half by 2005.17' The success is, however, mainly
political in getting Congress to enact something.'7 1 Congress and
environmentalists have known for many years how to make major
reductions in SO 2 emissions in a cost-effective manner: power plants
should switch from high sulfur coal to low sulfur coal or, even better,
from coal to natural gas. 80 Congress and EPA could simply have
17 "Sulfur dioxide (SO2) is a colorless, nonflammable, acidic gas with a
pungent odor. According to EPA, sulfur oxides are known to have many adverse
effects on health and welfare. Sulfur dioxide is also the key man-made component
in the creation of acid rain. Furthermore, sulfate particulates (a by-product of
sulfur dioxide) are the major man-made producer of smog in the western part of the
nation. The major industrial producer of sulfur dioxide is the fossil fuel-buming
plant, and electric utilities are the industry with the greatest number of these
facilities." FREEDMAN & JAGGI, AIR AND WATER POLLUTION, supra note 7, at 42.
178 "Title IV [of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments] deals with acid rain,
and this title will have the most significant impact on the electrical utility industry.
By 1995, 111 coal-fired power plants that are emitting more than 2.5
pounds/million British Thermal Units (BTUs) of sulfur dioxide must reduce their
collective emissions by 4.5 million tons. A 5.5 million ton reduction in sulfur
dioxide emissions will occur through the requirement that all plants meet a 1.2
lb/million BTU standard by the year 2000. As a result of these provisions, there
will still be 8.5 million tons of sulfur dioxide being emitted annually by coal-fired
plants after the year 2000." Id. at 6.
179 One writer has described Congress as cutting the "Gordian knot." Richard
F. Kosobud, Emissions Trading Emerges from the Shadows, in EMISSIONS
TRADING: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY'S NEW APPROACH, supra note 103, at 7.
1o "The most cost-effective means of reducing sulfur emissions is to burn
low-sulfur coal, but members of Congress from Midwestern states have warned
that such a change would economically devastate some communities whose main
industry is the production of high-sulfur coal." BRYNER, supra note 4, at 83. For
example, "burning coal without pollution control devices produces 100 to 200
times the weight of particulates as burning oil and 500 times more than burning
natural gas. As far as sulfur dioxide is concerned, oil produces one-third less sulfur
dioxide than as coal of equal sulfur content, and natural gas has essentially no
sulfur. Burning coal results in 2 to 4 times greater nitrogen oxides emissions
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commanded the electric utilities to make the change.s' By
commanding the change, Congress and EPA might have avoided
some of the costs of the Acid Rain Trading Program, and emission
reductions may have occurred more quickly. 82 Prior to the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments adopting the Acid Rain Trading Program,
however, a powerful coalition of high sulfur content mining and using
states had prevented Congress from taking any meaningful action on
acid rain."'
The reduction in SO2 emissions came with the costs necessary
to convince the powerful industry and other interest groups opposing
significant reductions in acid rain. First, EPA and environmentalists
compared to burning either oil or natural gas (holding all other things constant)."
FREEDMAN& JAGGI, AIR AND WATER POLLUTION REGULATION, supra note 7, at42
(note omitted).
1s1 Some claims that the market has enabled innovation that command-and-
control prevented are overstated. For example, one writer states: "The hypothesis
that traditional regulation and innovation do not go hand-in hand is certainly not
refuted by some of the history of SO, command and control from 1970 through
1990. Initially, higher smokestacks were required of coal-burning utilities; then
later, costly scrubber technology was imposed. The first reduced interest in other
more effective measures and succeeded mainly in spreading the precursors of acid
rain over a wider region. The second slowed the introduction of low-sulftir coal."
Richard F. Kosobud, Emissions Trading from the Shadows, in EMISSIONS
TRADING: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY'S NEW APPROACH, supra note 103, at 11.
This is an overstatement. Politics and non-environmental economic
reasons played a greater role in causing and eliminating this economic inefficiency
than instituting a market for SO2 emissions. First, the U.S. has known for many
years that tall stacks only spread pollution. BROWN ET AL., supra note 159, at 5
(U.S. opposed the use of tall stacks in Europe for that reason). Second, the
decision to allow tall stacks was a state political decision resulting from federal
inaction. FREEDMAN & JAGGI, AIR AND WATER POLLUTION, supra note 7, at 259.
Third, the decision to require all coal-fired power plants to use scrubbers was also
a political decision. BRYNER, supra note 4, at 102-03. Finally, railroad
deregulation and competition appears to have accelerated the use oflow-sulfur coal
in the Midwest. ELLERMAN ET AL., supra note 102, at 83, 247.
182 "[E]missions trading . . . [can] . . . lead to negligible or enormous
savings[.]" ELLERMAN ET AL., supra note 102, at 253.
183 Joskow & Schmalensee, Acid Rain Program, supra note 3, at 45-47.
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accepted a market-based and staged approach to reducing SO2
emissions. The Acid Rain Trading Program makes theoretical sense,
but market-based incentives were untried on such a scale.' Second,
the government gave away the tradable emission rights instead of
auctioning the rights off.8 s There were direct payments in the form
184 Significant skepticism about the translation of emissions trading from
theory to practice existed and probably still exists. "Consideration of those issues
suggests that any real marketable permit scheme will be a crude, nonoptimal
compromise precisely because a more finely-tuned scheme will often carry with it
prohibitively high transaction and knowledge costs. Furthermore, the interests of
buyers and sellers in such markets will be unusually aligned. Under some
circumstances they will have a mutual incentive to overstate what the seller has
conveyed to the buyer. As a result, natural market antagonism will not necessarily
operated to discipline market participants and much of the burdensome
enforcement process associated with current regulation will have to remain in
place." Marc J. Roberts, Some Problems ofImplementing Marketable Pollution
Rights Schemes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, in REFORM OF ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION 93, 94 (Wesley A. Magat, ed. 1982).
185 "The attraction to emitters of emissions trading over pollution taxes is due
in large part, as our contributors explain, to the free allocation of tradable credits
to individual sources ... If these tradable entitlements were to be auctioned off
rather than freely allocated, so that emitters would have to pay for their initial
allocation, the difference between the financial impact of taxes and trading would
diminish, as would the political support for emissions trading. There is a social
cost to this free allocation, however, because it denies revenue to the government."
Richard F. Kosobud, Emissions Trading Emergesfrom the Shadows, in EMISSIONS
TRADING: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY'S NEW APPROACH, supra note 103, at 7, 15.
"On the regulatory demand side, freely distributed tradable permits, like command-
and-control, distribute rents to regulated firms. The property rights involved in the
SO, tradable permit program are worth about $1 billion. This is a gift bestowed on
private firms by the federal government. In addition to that, like new source
performance standards, freely distributed permits give rise to entry barriers, and if
there are entry barriers together with rents, those rents are sustainable, just as in the
case of command-and-control. In addition, freely distributed permits offer much
greater degrees of political control, compared with auctioned permits or taxes, . .
. the legislature ... can essentially bribe the constituencies. Think about the 3.5
million bonus allowances in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, on top of
what was a 10 million ton program for reducing S02 emissions. Those 3.5 million
tons ofbonus allowances were fundamental to creating the constituencies necessary
to move the legislation through Congress." Robert N. Stavins, What do we really
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of extra tradable emission rights to opposition groups."' Third, the
baseline used to calculate reductions favored existing electric utilities
by using actual emissions and including grandfathered power
plants.'87
Moreover, the Acid Rain Program has not run its course or
proven its success. As with any environmental program, emission
reductions made at the beginning are the easiest and cheapest."'
Later, if and when energy prices rise steeply because the price of
tradable emission rights rise or another oil crises, then political
pressures will mount to delay the emission reductions in the Acid
Rain Program.'18 The Acid Rain Program should help Congress resist
the political pressure to delay emissions reductions by reducing the
overall cost of the program, but the history of the electric utility
Know About Market-Based Approaches to Environmental Policy? Lessons from
Twenty-Five Years of Experience, in EMISSIoNS TRADING: ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY'S NEW APPROACH, supra note 103, at 49, 52. The articles relies on the
Joskow and Schmalensee working paper that led to JOSKOW & SCHMALENSEE,
supra note 3.
186 JOSKOW & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 3, at 58. Interestingly, Joskow &
Schmalensee found that the Midwestern states with most of the "dirty" power
plants appeared not to have done particularly well. Id. at 79.
187 The Bush Administration originally proposed a "Simple Rule" designed
"to bring old coal-fired generating units, which account for the bulk of SO2
emissions, into conformity with 1971 NSPS in aggregate," but it was rejected.
ELLERMAN ET AL., supra note 102, at 48-50.
188 Initially allowance prices were much lower than expected, and utilities
banked allowances for future use. Id. at 297-99, 161-65.
189 "Besides the shift in emphasis on different environmental issues and the
issue of deregulation, other aspects have changed the importance of environmental
policy. Whereas in the late sixties and early seventies the environmental issue was
pressing, in the middle and late seventies and the early eighties, the oil crises was
dominating the political arena. ... With the oil crisis subsiding in the mid-eighties,
environmental disruption became more prominent, especially in Europe . .. "
SIEBERT, supra note 7, at 166.
"In the nineties [in Germany], the prevention of CO, [has] moved to the
foreground. One may wonder which impact on environmental policy the next
energy price rise will have. It seems rather difficult to have continuity in such a
context." Id. at 167.
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industry has shown that Congress reacts quickly and strongly to any
threat to the energy supply.
The Acid Rain Program is an environmental success story.
Thirty years after the 1970 Clean Air Act, the electric utility industry
will finally significantly reduce SO 2 emissions and acid rain.
V. EPA's PROPOSED CHANGES TO NSR
On April 3, 1996, EPA published proposed changes to the
NSR Program.190 In 1998, EPA proposed further possible
revisions."' The proposed changes were intended to "significantly
streamline and simplify the process of determining which new and
modified industrial facilities must be reviewed for significant
environmental impact." 9 2  Several changes reflect the existing
policies and the remaining continued the "streamline" NSR review.
The overall purpose of "the proposed reforms . . . [would be
to] . . . significantly reduce the number and types of activities at
sources that would otherwise be subject to major NSR under the
existing NSR Program regulations,"'93 revise the netting baseline used
to determine a major modification,'94 and "promote the use of
innovative technologies.""' States would also be given more
flexibility to "customize their own regulations implementing the NSR
190 Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New
Source Review (NSR), 61 Fed. Reg. 38,250,38,250 (proposed July 23, 1996)(to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 51 & 52).
191 Statement of Regulatory Procedures, 63 Fed. Reg. 61,340, 61,369 (Nov.
9, 1998).
192 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Reinvention Activity, at
http://www.epa.gov/reinvent/notebook/srnaps.htn (revised Mar. 28, 1998).
'93 Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New
Source Review (NSR), 61 Fed. Reg. at 38,251.
194 Id. at 38,258.
195 Id. at 38,251.
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Program." 96
The proposed regulations would significantly reduce NSR at
sources. "' [C]lean' emission units and 'clean' facilities and pollution
control and pollution prevention projects" would not undergo "major
NSR."'9" States could "exclude from major NSR, proposed changes
to existing emissions units that have installed major BACT or LAER
within the last 10 years' 8 or which otherwise qualify as a 'clean
unit."" 9 9 Sources would have to show that the "changes ... do not
increase the unit's hourly potential emissions."200
EPA supports this proposal by noting that a "paramount goal"
of NSR is to "ensur[e] that modified units apply state-of-the-art
controls."201 Where a source has undergone a recent major NSR, it
will likely have state-of-the-art controls.202 Therefore, "in many cases
where an existing well-controlled unit triggers major NSR, the
permitting process does not necessarily result in improved
controls."203 It is only a waste of time and money.
Similar changes are proposed for "clean facilities."204
Facilities may contain many emitting units. EPA went further and
196 Id. The regulations would also "address concerns raised about the
permitting of sources near protected National Parks and other wilderness areas
(Federal Class I areas)[.]" Id.
'9 Id.
19 Id. at 38,255. EPA provides three situations that qualify for the ten years.
"(1) BACT or LAER limits set within the last 10 years for the particular unit; (2)
a limit set within the last 10 years for the particular unit by a State technology
review program determined by EPA to be comparable to the Federal BACT or
LAER programs; and (3) a limit found on a case-by-case basis-after notice and
opportunity for public comment-to be comparable to the current BACT or LAER
limits that would otherwise be imposed on the source after weighing the cost and
benefits of additional or modified controls, including retrofit cost and benefits."
Id. at 38,256.
199 Id. at 38,255.
200 Id.
201 Id
202 Id
203 Id
204 Id. at 38,258.
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sought comments "on whether . .. this proposed approach should not
allow units or facilities to be replaced or reconstructed." 205
Furthermore, EPA proposed to increase the "netting baseline"
used to determine whether a modification would result in an increase
in emissions from two years out of the previous five years for all
sources, including utilities, to the highest consecutive 12-month
period of utilization within the ten years prior to the proposed
change.20 6 EPA proposed this change to eliminate confusion,207 and
to avoid forcing "plant managers [whose plants have low utilization
rates] with the choice of surrendering capacity (that would not be
considered representative ofnormal operations underthe currentNSR
rules) or taking the time and expense to secure a major NSR permit
for even small, non-excluded changes to a portion of the plant."208
EPA would eliminate the exception in the WEPCO Rule that
allowed a power plant to avoid NSR if the plant's potential-to-emit
increased solely because of increased demand.209 "For the same
reason that the demand growth exclusion would ignore the realities
of a deregulated electric power sector, EPA believes that it should not
be extended to non utility units. For consumer-driven industries,
demand is inextricably intertwined with changes that improve a
source's ability to utilize its capacity; thus, it cannot be said that
demand growth is an 'independent factor,' separable from a given
physical or operational change. Modifications which affect
operational characteristics of a unit are not made without reason, and
the most likely reason for an economically competitive source to
205 Id.
206 Id. Criticism of EPA's method of calculating a baseline in cyclical
industries began before EPA had even promulgated the final WEPCO Rule. Ayres
& Parker, supra note 107, at 10208-09.
207 Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) andNonattainment ofNew
Source Review (NSR), 61 Fed. Reg. at 38,259.
208 Id. at 38,258.
209 Notice of Availability; Alternatives for New Source review (NSR)
Applicability for Major Modifications; Solicitation of Comment, 63 Fed. Reg. at
39,860. Criticism of the demand growth exception also began before EPA had
even promulgated the WEPCO Rule. Ayres & Parker, supra note 107, at 10209.
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undertake such changes is to enable it to create or respond to
increased demand."210
The proposed rules also seek to promote the use of innovative
technologies through expanding the WEPCO Rule and formally
adopting much of the Seitz PCP Guidance.21' The proposed rules
define "pollution control project" more broadly than the WEPCO
Rule, "[d]eletes the requirement that add-on controls and fuel
switches be subject to an 'environmentally beneficial' test[.]" 212 The
primary safeguard is that no project can result in an increase in actual
emissions that will "cause or contribute to a violation of any NAAQS
or PSD increment, or visibility limitation." 213
The proposed rules significantly streamline and reduce the
number of major NSR from current regulations and practice by
instituting an actual emissions cap. The proposed rules also retain or
expand some of the exceptions to NSR already in place.
VI. EPASHOULD ADOPT AMORE FLEXIBLE NSRPROGRAM
AND USE THE SAVINGS TO FINANCE ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPROVEMENTS
"We are not ready to suspect any person of being defective in
selfishness,"2 14 Adam Smith wrote. Two hundred years later
businesses still try to maximize their profits in a market-based
210 63 Fed. Reg. at 39,860-61.
211 Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Nonattainment New Source
Review, 61 Fed. Reg. at 38,260.
212 Id. "The proposed exception is designed to minimize procedural
delays[.]" Id. In light of the fact that "[flor the proposed list of pollution control
projects and for fuel switches to a less-polluting fuel, EPA is satisfied that the
overall impact on the environment of these projects is beneficial and that,
consequently, such projects are desirable from an environmental perspective." Id.
at 38,263.
213 Id. at 38,260-6 1.
214 ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 446 (1892).
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economy.2 15 Moral appeals have only a limited effectiveness when
the survival of a business is at stake.216 Traditional command-and-
control regulations have well-known problems although, if enforced,
they can if effective to regulate health based standards."' Market-
based incentives probably cannot work, however, on a regional level
with pollutants that have dangerous local effects2 18 or great
complexity. 219  The question is, therefore, how should EPA
implement NSR to meet the goals of the Clean Air Act given these
constraints. 220 EPA has proposed a complicated NSR Program that
seeks to increase flexibility while retaining elements ofthe traditional
NSR Program. It is unlikely, however, to work very well because it
215 SIEBERT, supra note 7, at 126. "The principle has to start from the
premise that the agents will maximize their utility or their profits. Thus, if we
consider production, the environmental policy maker as a principal has to take into
account the optimality conditions of firms as a restraint of its maximization
behavior." Id.
216 Id. at 129. Moral suasion "may bring about results, but since the
economic success of an enterprise is the central element of a free-market system,
we cannot rely on firms to consider the social effects of their economic decision.
Rather, it should be the task of the economist to change the frame of reference (the
data corona) of the private economic decisions in such a way that social costs are
internalized." Id.
217 Id. at 131. "The advantage of the regulatory approach is seen in its
ecological incidence. If the quality target is properly set and if private emitters do
not violate the relevant laws, then the quality target will be reached." Id.
218 See ELLERMAN ET AL., supra note 102, at 316.
219 Stavins, supra note 185, at 49. But see ELLERMAN ETAL., supra note 103,
at 321 ("Though it can be described relatively simply, the operation of the U.S.
Acid Rain Program was in fact fairly complicated, and details of the legislation and
related regulations mattered."). There is certainly a need to minimize transactions
costs. Id. at 318.
220 SIEBERT, supra note 7, at 126. "According to the principal-agent
literature, the policy maker as a principal chooses the desired environmental quality
and attempts to influence the decisions of the individual agents, namely the
households and the firms, in such a way that the target is eventually reached. The
problem then is to devise an institutional arrangement and to define incentives
which make sure that the behavior of the individual agents contributes to the
overall target. This is the issue of incentive compatibility." Id. (citations omitted).
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is too complicated and creates negative environmental and economic
incentives. It also suffers, like any approach, from the lack of clear
Congressional guidance about how to approach pollution in
attainment areas. A better approach combines a very flexible
approach that produces economic savings and then uses those savings
to finance emission reductions at sources221 by requiring sources to
reduce actual emissions from the cap by a certain percentage or
undergo NSR.222
Environmentalists often retain a deep-seated suspicion of
market-based incentives, increased flexibility for sources, and
industry. People have offered many possible reasons for this
suspicion ranging from "symbolic politics" 223 to a desire to have
"more control over the distributional effects of environmental
regulation" 224 to the legal training of most regulators and
legislators.225 For the purposes of this article, it is enough to note that
the suspicion exists and some cause exists for it. After all, industry
quite naturally overused the environment as a receptacle for waste
when it would maximize profit.226 For the last thirty years industry
opposed many environmental initiatives, whether rightly or wrongly,
22 ELLERMAN ET AL., supra note 102, at 253. "The inefficiency argument
implies that resources are wasted. Thus, the opportunity costs are too high. Since
the costs of environmental policy will have an effect on the target level, inefficient
abatement implies less environmental quality. Therefore, the regulatory approach
reduces the chances for an effective environmental policy." SIEBERT, supra note
7, at 131-32.
2m Requiring existing sources to reduce emissions by a date certain would
place more pressure on sources to develop new pollution control technology and
reduce the source's incentiveto continue operating withoutmodification. Congress
has traditionally protected existing sources, however, in the Clean Air Act.
2M Stavins, supra note 185, at 51.
224 Id.
M Id. at 50-51. See also SIEBERT, supra note 7, at 145 (it is difficult to
transplant the U.S. bubble concept in part due to legal thinking in certain
institutional settings).
226 This is the standard explanation for pollution. See SIEBERT, supra note
7, at 16-18.
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as too costly or unjustified.227 Industry strongly supports market-
based incentives or increased source flexibility as a solution to
pollution. It does not require a Freud or Skinner to understand why
environmentalists warm slowly to the idea ofmarket-based incentives
and greater source flexibility.
Nonetheless, environmentalists should carefully228 use market-
based incentives and greater source flexibility to finance protection
of and improvement in the environment. They need not
philosophically accept the free-market system as morally the best
economic system.2 29 They need only accept that business will act to
maximize profits in our current economic system and use it to protect
the environment better.230
The political fight to turn these cost-savings into
environmental protection will likely be difficult, but a true cap-and-
trade NSR Program may provide political capital for environmental
protection that the current system has not. The Clean Air Act
contained lofty environmental protection goals, 23' but Congress
compromised those goals many times for economic and energy goals.
These compromises have contributed to public cynicism, 232 and has
sometimes led to economic inefficiencies, regional conflicts, and
inaction, as in the case of acid rain. Command-and-control
regulations have led to conflict between regulators and industry that
227 The history of acid rain is but one example of many.
228 ELLERMAN ET AL., supra note 102, at 321. "Experience with and lessons
learned from the Acid Rain Program must be applied with care to other
environmental objectives." Id.
229 WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 11 (1988). "Positive
economics seeks to determine how resources are in fact allocated in an economy.
A somewhat different analysis of economic theory is normative, taking a definite
moral position on what should be done." Id. (emphasis in original).
230 See infra note 220.
231 Stavins, supra note 185, at 51. "Also, on the regulatory supply side,
standards are much more consistent with symbolic politics." Id. (citation omitted).
232 BRYNER, supra note 4, at xvii.
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is counterproductive to protecting the environment.233 The conflict
has also eroded necessary political support for environmental
programs.
Assuming that the necessary preconditions for protecting the
public health, cap-and-trade environmental regulations should
increase political support for environmental protection. They should
lessen conflict by increasing cost-effectiveness and by reducing the
number of disagreements between regulators and industry. Less
political opposition will make it easier for Congress to stand firm.
Furthermore, Congressional inaction will not always mean little or no
action to protect the environment as it did when federal inaction on
acid rain allowed Midwestern coal-fired power plants to build tall
stacks instead of installing expensive pollution control technology.234
In addition, sources will continue to have incentives to reduce or
eliminate pollution in order to produce goods or to trade emission
rights.
Environmentalists should recognize that command-and-
control regulations often produce long delays in implementing
pollution control technology. EPA must find the resources to
determine the proper technology, then actually determine it. Almost
inevitably, industry or environmental groups will challenge EPA's
determination in court. The court, which has less expertise than
either EPA or industry, must learn the issue and decide it.235 All the
233 Richard F. Kosobud, Emissions Trading Emerges from the Shadows, in
EMissioNs TRADING: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY'sNEWAPPROACH, supra note 103,
at 3, 12. "Another telling criticism of relying solely on centralized control is that
it leads to undue confrontation between regulated and regulating communities that
can result in behavior on both sides that detracts from the goal of achieving a
cleaner environment cost-effectively." Id.
FREEDMAN AND JAGGI, AIR AND WATER POLLUTION, supra note 7, at 259.
23s SIEBERT, supra note 7, at 134. "Regulations give a greater role to the
courts in the allocation process. But, excluding exceptional cases, allocation of
resources cannot be undertaken by the courts." Id. "Judges are not experts in the
[environmental] field and are not part of either political branch ofthe Government.
Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the
basis ofthe judge's personal policy preferences." Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
2000] 51
52 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8
while, nothing happens.
From a theoretical viewpoint, cap-and-trade and other market-
based regulations can have the advantage of clarifying the choices
among environmental protection, energy needs, and economic
growth. Gone are the days when we can optimistically write of
creating a pristine environment. 236 Command-and-control based on
unrealistic or impossible goals hides the balancing between various
interests. 237 This is especially true for attainment areas where air
quality is presumed safe with respect to criteria pollutants.
A tradable-permit system lends itself better to discuss the
inevitable and political238 tradeoffs. Grandfathering the baseline in a
tradable-permit system also hides some of the costs,239 but the
discussion explicitly considers cost-effectiveness.
Perhaps the time has come to accept the need for market-
based incentives in as many areas as reasonably possible. The
Environmental Defense Fund supported the cap-and-trade Acid Rain
Program to reduce acid rain when every other approach failed. Other
environmental groups also accepted the need for the cap-and-trade
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 837 (1984). For a criticism of the courts in
environmental protection, see MEIBURG, supra note 68, at 419-29.
236 Stavins, supra note 185, at 51. "Consider the preambles to the Clean Air
Act or the Clean Water Act. Can we really claim with a straight face that we will
make all waters in America fishable and swimmable in the near future and that we
will do it with a pollution tax or a tradable permit system? On the other hand, we
can with a straight face, although it is fundamentally dishonest, talk about making
all waters in America fishable and swimmable in the near future using the 'best
available technology' to get there." Id.
237 Id. Finally, on the regulatory supply side, command-and-control standards
offer more control over the distributional effects of environmental regulation. It
is not left up to the market. Regulators in the past were understandably reticent to
turn any kind of environmental policy over to an economic instrument because that
means leaving it to the market to allocate costs among firms and, more importantly
in our representative democracy, among geographic areas (congressional districts)."
Id.
238 BRYNER, supra note 4, at xv-xvii.
239 Stavins, supra note 185, at 56.
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Acid Rain Program.240
A. The EPA ProposedNSR Propram creates an economically
inefficient and unsound system
EPA attempts to appropriately increase the flexibility in its
Proposed NSR Program to retain political support for necessary
environmental regulations. Incorporating flexibility and market-
based incentives into the command-and-control NSR Program risks
creating a program that works poorly as both. Unfortunately, EPA's
proposed changes create just such a program.
The Proposed NSR Program still requires modification of
many new sources under NSR. In order to increase flexibility,
however, it proposes to allow sources to modify their operations so
long as the changes do not result in actual emissions greater than the
actual emissions the source emitted during the previous ten years.
This will create an economically inefficient and environmentally
unsound system as the history of the WEPCO Rule and grandfathered
power plants demonstrates.
Granting existing sources the right to emit pollutants up to the
highest level emitted in the past ten years is massive transfer of
property rights to existing sources.2 41 They may emit the same
amount forever. They can avoid installing additional or newer
pollution control technology so long as they stay under their cap. On
the other hand, a source may install pollution control technology to
avoid exceeding the cap. The situation is similar to sources accepting
federally enforceable limits to avoid becoming a major source and
undergoing NSR.
Nonetheless, an actual emissions cap provides several
disincentives for sources to reduce emissions. First, a source loses its
right to emit to a certain level if it does not emit to that level at least
once every ten years. This provides a strong incentive for a source to
240 Id. at 53.
241 See id. at 52 (Acid Rain Trading Program).
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emit more than it would otherwise.24 2 This may result in a source
running "dirty" or maintaining a mix of "dirty" and "clean"
operations rather than switching to all "clean" operations.243 In
particular, the useful life of "dirty" existing sources is extended
beyond their normal life because they provide the "profit" of
maintaining the cap. In some cases, sources may become
economically viable again if new sources must install expensive
pollution control technology.
Second, source flexibility and caps do not translate
automatically into technological innovation. So long as the
modification results in the same or less emissions, then the source
may choose not to install any pollution control technology. Putting
this another way, the source must have an economic reason to want
to reduce emissions from part of its facility before it will invest in the
necessary pollution control technology to do so. 24 4 In other instances,
closing an obsolescent product line may provide the emissions credits
necessary to run a new line without installing the latest pollution
control technology. To the extent industry can avoid developing new
242 SIEBERT, supra note 7, at 141. "The problem of uncertainty may be
prevented by giving pollution rights to the existing polluters. . . Although the
incentive to reduce pollution would exist once this policy were implemented, there
would be undesired announcement effects between the time that the measure were
proposed and made effective. That is, firms would have an incentive to produce
many pollutants upon learning of this policy consideration in order to receive a
larger quantity of pollution rights later. Since it would take a long time to enact
and possibly clarify ... such an institutional arrangement, the announcement effect
may be important." Id.
243 "[T]he current rights seems so imperfectthat several firms have suggested
in interviews that they have kept dirty and inefficient facilities in operation longer
than they otherwise would have. The predominant role of internal offsets suggests
that this is not an isolated phenomenon." Marc J. Roberts, Some Problems of
Implementing Marketable Pollution Rights Schemes: The Case of the Clean Air
Act, in REFORM OF ENVTL REG. 104 (Wesley A. Magat, ed., 1982).
244 Any regulatory system must provide effective incentives to develop new
technology. BRYNER, supra note 4, at 4.
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pollution control technology, it will.2 45 Innovation will likely occur
only with respect to new sources.
Third, the proposed NSR regulations will increase the existing
new source bias in the Clean Air Act and cause economic
inefficiency. New sources must install pollution control technology
that existing sources might not have to install just as in the current
system. Additionally, existing sources may be able to modify their
operations without installing the latest pollution control technology
so long as actual emissions does not exceed its cap.246
Fourth, the continued effort of Congress and EPA to cover
every situation, while understandable, increases complexity and may
eventually reduces economic efficiency. The proposed regulations
provide for PCPs and ICTs. In some instances this will encourage
new technology and reduced pollution. These exceptions increase,
however, administrative complexity and expense. They may create
the impression of unfairness beyond that created by requiring new
sources to install different pollution control technology than old
sources. If EPA ever creates an inter-source market, however, these
exceptions will increase uncertainty over the value of any property
rights to emit and reduce cost-effectiveness. 24 7
The proposed NSR regulations will be economically
inefficient and not protect the environment because they
unsuccessfully combine traditional command-and-control with
increased flexibility and cost-effectiveness. Grandfathered power
plants under the WEPCO Rule demonstrate the dangers of the
245 SIEBERT, supra note 7, at 133. "The grandfather clause is an incentive to
use old technology. The state ofthe art requirement encrusts the given technology
and does not introduce a decentralized incentive to improve abatement and
production technology. And the closing off of a region to a newcomer reduces
mobility and implies efficiency losses." Id.
246 Stavins, supra note 185, at 55.
247 TIETENBERG, supra note 38, at 197. "From a cost-effectiveness point of
view, the crucial characteristic of any baseline is consistency. The same baseline
should be used to define the operating permits, to construct the emissions inventory
used to demonstrate attainment or progress toward attainment, and to define surplus
reductions suitable for certification as emission reduction credits." Id.
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proposed NSR regulations.
B. Any reform of the NSR Program should increase
flexibility to decrease the cost of pollution control and use the
savings to finance ambient air quality improvements in both
attainment and nonattainment areas
No perfect solution presents itself to regulating air pollution.
Traditional command-and-control has worked, but at a political and
economic cost. Pure market-based incentives cannot work
everywhere.2 48 A combination increasing flexibility while retaining
aspects of the traditional command-and-control risk combining the
worst of both systems. A better approach is to combine a very
flexible approach that produces economic savings and use those
savings to finance emission reductions at sources by requiring sources
to reduce actual emissions from the cap by a large percentage or
undergo NSR.249
The current NSR Program based on command-and-control has
improved the environment. Significant progress has occurred,
although stubborn problems remain.25 0 Nor has the NSR Program
248 SIEBERT, supra note 7, at 139. It can be difficult to create pollution
markets. "This requires that pollution licenses are clearly defined and property
rights guaranteed, that the potential market volume is large enough and that search
and transaction costs are kept to a minimum. If these conditions are not fulfilled,
the polluters' benefits from abatement are uncertaint [sic] and potentially beneficial
investments and trading in pollution licenses remain below optimum level." Id
249 Id. at 131-32. "The inefficiency argument implies that resources are
wasted. Thus, opportunity costs are too high. Since the costs of environmental
policy will have an effect on the target level, inefficient abatement implies less
environmental quality. Therefore, the regulatory approach reduces the chances for
an effective environmental policy." Id at 131.
250 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Report Stresses Needfor
Continued Air Improvement (Aug. 7, 2000) at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opal
admpress.nst. Environmentalists and industry both agree that the United States has
reduced improved air quality in some areas. "In the over 20 years since Earth Day
and the passage of the Clean Air Act of 1970, the change in air quality can be
categorized as indicating that progress has been made, but there is still a long way
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frozen pollution control technology since 1970. Industry has made
significant improvements in pollution control technology in many
areas.25' The technology-forcing aspect of the current NSR Program
does, however, depend on regulators to actively, even aggressively,
challenge industry's natural predilection to use existing technology.252
Market-based incentives probably cause more innovation through by
tapping the source's greater knowledge and increasing the source's
economic motive, but the current NSR Program has worked to force
technology and improve the environment better than no program at
all.
EPA has already incorporated cost-effectiveness, energy
needs, and economic concerns into the NSR Program through offsets,
requiring new and modified sources to emit "significant" levels of
pollution before undergoing NSR, and bubbles. EPA has also
adopted the WEPCO Rule, the PCP policy, and the ICT regulation to
reduce the cost of pollution control technology or to provide
to go." FREEDMAN & JAGGI, AIR AND WATER POLLUTION, supra note 7, at 17.
"Overall, the results of the analysis suggest that mandated pollution control
investments have often had a significant effect in reducing air pollution levels. The
effects of regulatory controls, however, generally have been overshadowed by the
effects of economic changes, weather, and other factors. We also found that local
factors, such as the level of manufacturing activity and local pollution control
investments, fail to account for a majority of the variation in local air quality. The
finding underscores the importance of regional or national factors (both regulatory
and nonregulatory) in determining local air quality." Id. at 95.
251 See William DePriest, Development and Maturing of Environmental
Control Technologies in the Power Industry, in EMissioNs TRADING:
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY'S NEW APPROACH, supra note 103, at 168-85
(describing improvements in pollution control for coal fired power plants).
252 SIEBERT, supra note 7, at 133. "The government will try to prove that new
technologies are possible whereas the entrepreneur will use his energy to show that
these new technologies are not feasible or not economical.... Whereas in a market
economy it is the role of firms to find new technologies, given our scenario, firms
will relinquish this function to the government." Id. "The existing theoretical
literature, however, does not demonstrate that market-based instruments generally
provide stronger or weaker incentives to innovate than do command-and-control
regimes." ELLERMAN ET AL., supra note 102, at 295 (footnote omitted).
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incentives for innovation. These latter rules and policies have not
worked well and should be eliminated in order to simplify NSR and
increase fairness. Increasing the significance level of pollution that
triggers NSR would provide greater flexibility and fairness without
making a major change to the system.253
The current NSR Program probably cannot continue, however,
without major changes for political reasons. The current NSR
Program has also proven costly politically. Economists and
commentators debate the exact costs of the current NSR Program,254
but the U.S. economy has been able to bear the costs and still grow. 255
The political cost of the traditional command-and-control has risen
steadily because the marginal cost of pollution control has risen
steadily, the perceived benefits decrease once the NAAQS is met, the
inevitable confrontations necessary under command-and control,256
and economists have convinced people of the possible benefits of
market-based incentives.2 57
EPA can protect and enhance environmental quality by
simplifying its proposed NSR regulations to save costs and then using
those cost-savings to convince industry to agree to a percentage based
25 The complexity of calculating a source's potential-to-emit, grandfathering
and the new source bias of the current system would also continue.
254 FREEDMAN & JAGGI, AIR AND WATER POLLUTION, supra note 7, at 17.
"Although a number of economic studies were conducted to assess the impact of
pollution control on the American economy, their overall findings are
inconclusive." Id.
255 Id. (noting that the gross national product of the United States increased,
in constant 1982 dollars, 72% between 1970 and 1989 while pollution abatement
expenditures increased 100% between 1972 and 1988). (footnote omitted). "[lit
is possible to reduce air pollution and still have a thriving economy." Id. "Clean
air is also compatible with other policy goals such as a strong economy . . ..[i]ts
improvement is a prerequisite for efficient economic activity .. .. [s]ince pollution
from industrial activity is waste, reducing it can reduce the costs of production."
BRYNER, supra note 4, at xvi.
256 See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
257 Stavins, supra note 185, at 53. "Fourth, there has been an unmistakable
shift of the political center toward [market-based regulation]" Id.
2000] NEW SOURCE REVIEW 59
reduction258 in actual emissions whenever they make major
modification.259 Adopting the proposed cap in actual emissions260
258 SIEBERT, supra note 7, at 90 & 93. "In practical environmental policy,
sufficient information on prevented damage in monetary terms very often is not
available. Standards for minimum quality of environmental media then are often
established on ad hoc basis taking into account information available in the
different scientific disciplines on impact of pollutants on health or on the natural
environment.... It is reasonable to view these standards as fixed targets or as
normative restrictions to other policy decisions." Id.
25 Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Nonattainment New Source
Review, 61 Fed. Reg. 38,250, 38,265 (July 23, 1996)(to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
§§ 51 & 52). EPA has proposed to periodically review the actual emissions cap,
but this provides industry with no incentive to reduce emissions, no certainty, and
invites future conflicts. Requiring emission reductions after a set period oftime as
in the Acid Rain Program would reduce the new source bias of the Clean Air Act,
but is probably politically impossible. Id.
260 EPA must base the cap on actual emissions and not the permitted or
potential-to-emit emissions. "The problem [of command and control served as the
baseline] arises because historically there was not one baseline, buttwo-allowable
and actual emissions. Traditionally in the command-and-control approach, uniform
emission standards were defined for category of sources .. . with the standards
being set so as to ensure that even the most difficult-to-control source within the
category could comply. For the other sources within the category, actual emissions
frequently turned out to be considerably lower than allowable emissions. With an
allowable emission baseline, the difference between allowable and actual emissions
could be certified as an emission reduction credit; with an actual emissions
baseline, it could not." TIETENBERG, supra note38, at 197.
If science has not advanced far enough to measure particular emissions,
then EPA should base the cap on the most emissions reasonably possible. This
protects the environment and public health. It gives, however, sources more
property rights than they would have if actual emissions were measurable. Sources
will also have incentives not to develop new emissions monitoring equipment
because the new monitoring equipment will reduce their cap. Both of these effects
are important. The need to protect and enhance ambient air quality, especially
from local toxic effects, however, should override these concerns in most
situations.
The importance of the area's attainment status in evaluating the public
policy options may change this evaluation. If the area meets the NAAQS, then
EPA might consider calculating a more stringent cap so long as the pollutant has
few local toxic effects. This might actually encourage sources to develop better
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will increase flexibility for sources and improve cost-effectiveness.
While sources still must determine whether they have undergone a
"major modification," they avoid the administrative and opportunity
costs of NSR and perhaps the cost of installing expensive pollution
control equipment.
The actual emissions cap imposes costs on the surrounding
community.2 6' They must live with more pollution than they would
if the traditional NSR Program applied and forced installation of
additional pollution control technology. In non-attainment areas
where the ambient air quality fails to protect the public health,
allowing sources to continue to emit pollutants at the highest level
emitted in the last ten years raises strong public health and fairness
concerns. In such areas, the public health concerns rightly take
precedence over cost-effectiveness.262
The public health analysis is not, however, one-dimensional.
The continued operation of a source may provide jobs, taxes, and
other benefits to the surrounding community. Jobs provide health
care benefits. Taxes support social services including public health
programs and education. Nonetheless, those immediately
surrounding a source likely suffer an environmental detriment that
monitoring technology. On the other hand, practicality and fairness would seem
to argue against making such fine distinctions.
261 Geographical location can be apoor surrogate for determining who bears
the burden of air pollution. Tall stacks can transport certain pollutants long
distance. Particular weather conditions may cause hazardous conditions in areas
usually lightly impacted. These are important issues, but my suggested solution
applies with even more force if the impacted population is far away. Distant
sources may gain few, if any, benefits to offset any health detriment from the
source's operation.
262 SIEBERT, supra note 7, at 129. "If the environmental problem is regarded
as being very serious for certain environmental medium, then the status of
ecological efficiency possibly acquires a higher rank in comparison to economic
efficiency. Ifthe environmental situation is estimated such that after consideration
of the transition costs, a short-term solution is not imperative, then the criterion of
economic efficiency becomes more important." Id.
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others do not.263
The new source bias imposed by the current NSR regulations
causes further complexity in evaluating public health effects of a
regulatory scheme as the history of grandfathered power plants show.
The cost of NSR and installing new pollution control technology
discourages sources from modifying their operations. They continue
to pollute in the same manner as before for a longer period than if the
traditional NSR Program had not applied. The current NSR Program
actually imposes, therefore, a health cost on people surrounding
grandfathered and other plants without modem pollution control
technology.
Increasing flexibility will encourage sources to modify their
operations by making modifications more cost-effective. Doing so
will likely not be Pareto-optimal2" because altering the operations of
the source will almost inevitably create some losers in the
surrounding community. Some individuals will prefer ambient air
quality improvements to almost any economic benefit.26 s Under the
current NSR Program, obsolescence or new pollution control
technology would have lowered emissions eventually and improved
ambient air quality. If the proposed NSR regulations are adopted,
however, then a source may continue to emit the same level of
263 For a discussion on how the Acid Rain Trading Program may affect the
distribution of emissions and therefore of health benefits, see Dallas Burthaw,
Appraisal of the SO2 Cap-and-Trade Market, in EMISSIONS TRADING:
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY'S NEW APPROACH, supra note 103, at 145-49.
264 See JULES L. COLMAN, MARKETS MORALS AND THE LAW 97 (1988). A
"Pareto-optimal" position is one where no Pareto-improvements can be made. Id.
at 97-98. In different language, a position is Pareto-optimal "if there are no
transfers remaining to be made among the people involved that could make any of
them better off-according to their own respective preferences-without making
others worse off by their respective preferences." THOMAS SOWELL, MARKETS
AND MINORITIES 6 (1981). See also Coleman supra, at 102.
265 For example, one can imagine a particularly sensitive individual who
derives no benefits from the plant's continued operation because of social factors
or who suffers severe injuries or dies because of continued exposure. That one
individual would be worse off by continued operation of the plant. The result
would not be Pareto-optimal. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 7, at 44.
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pollutants forever so long as it stays beneath the actual emissions cap.
On the other hand, requiring a source to undergo NSR and install
expensive pollution control technology may reduce or eliminate
employment opportunities for some in the surrounding community.
There is no Pareto-optimal solution.
Economists have developed the "Kaldor-Hicks efficiency"
criterion to evaluate situations where society benefits as a whole from
an action but where there are still some losers.266 A Kaldor-Hicks
efficient result "requires that gainers explicitly compensate losers in
any change."267 Requiring sources to reduce actual emissions by a
large set percentage would improve ambient air quality and provide
a likely health benefit. The employment and other economic effects
would be less because the source would not undergo NSR and install
specified pollution control technology. The source could still pick
and choose among an array of options to find the most cost-effective
method to reduce actual emissions. The source would have an
incentive to develop innovative pollution control technology. Some
people may be worse off because they lose ajob that they would have
kept if no emission reductions had occurred, but it is likely fewer
people will be worse off than in the other approaches.
The emphasis on protecting the public health has precedent in
nonattainment areas where sources must obtain offsets before making
a major modification or locating the area. Several differences
between my proposed approach and the traditional offset program
improve the public health benefits and economic efficiency for
modified sources. First, the source need not look elsewhere to find
reductions in pollution. It need only look internally. This will save
time and money. Second, any reductions will come from actual
emissions rather than doubtful shut-downs and paper offsets created
by imaginative permit writing. Encouraging modification of existing
sources by reducing the new source bias of the Clean Air Act will
cause sources modify grandfathered and older plants and therefore
266 Id. at 43-44.
267 Id. at 44.
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install some pollution control technology they would not otherwise
install. It will hopefully lead to repeated modifications that gradually
eliminate the extra room in the ten-year cap.
The emphasis on protecting public health in requiring sources
to reduce actual emissions by a large percentage or undergo NSR is
more problematical in attainment areas where the ambient air quality
meets NAAQS. By definition the public health is protected in
attainment areas. Why should a source have to reduce its actual
emissions when its emissions do not cause any harm? Congress faced
and answered a similar question when it enacted the PSD program to
protect ambient air quality in attainment areas.268 Just as in nonattain-
ment areas, an actual emissions cap in PSD areas perpetuates a strong
new source bias.269 Furthermore, if the area is close to violating the
NAAQS, then a new source must choose between relocating or
installing additional pollution technology.
On a more practical level, the arguments made above for
requiring sources to reduce actual emissions by a large percentage or
undergo NSR apply equally in attainment areas. Providing sources
with increased flexibility should result in air quality improvements as
well because everyone should benefit from the cost savings of
increased flexibility. Firms desiring to locate in an attainment area
would also benefit from having a larger increment available to use.
Requiring sources that make major modifications to reduce
actual emissions by a large percentage or undergo traditional NSR
strikes a balance between economic efficiency and environmental
protection better than the proposed NSR regulations. The next
question is who should adopt this or any other major change to the
NSR Program.
263 See supra Part I.B.
269 SIEBERT, supra note 7, at 133. "Permits represent a protection for existing
firms; permits tend to perpetuate the given structure of existing firms.... New
firms may not be able to locate in a region although they may provide interesting
and improved employment opportunities." Id.
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Conclusion
Increasing flexibility in the NSR Program to improve cost
effectiveness will work if sources must choose between reducing
actual emissions and undergoing NSR if they construct a major
modification. This approach is more economically efficient and
improves air quality better than EPA's proposed NSR regulations.
Experience with pollution control at grandfathered power plants
strongly suggests that any approach that does not require reductions
in actual emissions will stagnate improvements in air quality and
pollution control technology.
